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Sharon N. Freytag* and Michelle E. McCoy**
ROFESSOR Russell Weintraub describes the subject matter of con-
flict of laws to include the "study of whether or not and, if so, in what
way, the answer to a legal question will be affected because the ele-
ments of the problem have contacts with more than one jurisdiction."' The
subject of conflict of laws presents three general categories of inquiry. What
court has jurisiction to adjudicate? Which law should be applied? What
effect will a judgment have on suits in other states or countries?2
During the survey period, several significant decisions occurred in each of
these areas. The United States Supreme Court decided that the due process
standard outlined in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 which the Court
in Shaffer v. Heitner4 stated applied to all assertions of jurisdiction, does not
apply to the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant served in
the forum state.5 The Court also decided that when a plaintiff initiates a
transfer under the federal venue statute, the transferee court must apply the
choice of law rules of the transferor court.6 The fact that a plaintiff selects
the federal court because of that forum's favorable statute of limitations and
then requests a transfer to his home state where the suit would have been
barred does not impact the general rule, which favors convenience and judi-
cial economy. 7 The most significant Texas state court decision during the
survey period was the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Dow Chemical Co.
v. Alfaro.8 In Alfaro the Texas Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which allows courts with jurisdiction to decline to
exercise that jurisdiction, does not apply in Texas to personal injury and
wrongful death cases brought under section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Prac-
* B.S., University of Kansas; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Southern Methodist
University; Attorney, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Louisiana State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney,
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1. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (3d. ed.
1986).
2. Id. at 1.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
6. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1279 (1990). See infra note 246 and ac-
companying text.
7. 110 S. Ct. at 1279.
8. 786 S.W.2d 674 ('ex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
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tice and Remedies Code.9 Rather, a foreign plaintiff has an absolute right to
bring a personal injury or wrongful death suit in Texas. One dissenting
judge in Alfaro observed that, as a result of that decision, foreign plaintiffs
have "hit pay dirt in Texas." 10 The Texas Supreme Court also upheld the
constitutionality of the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recog-
nition Act. 1
I. WHETHER THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE
A. Whether Personal Jurisdiction Exists
1. The General Principles that Apply to the Assertion of Personal
Jurisdiction
Generally, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant if two conditions are satisfied. First, the applicable long-arm stat-
ute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction.12 Second, the exercise of ju-
risdiction must be consistent with constitutional guarantees of due process.13
Although courts phrase these inquiries differently, the personal jurisdiction
analysis involves the same basic questions in state court and in federal court
diversity cases. 14
Texas courts have interpreted the Texas long-arm statute' 5 to extend to
the limits of due process. 16 Under the due process analysis, the party seek-
9. See infra notes 186-219 and accompanying text.
10. 786 S.W.2d at 697 (Cook, J., dissenting).
11. Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex.
1990). After this Article went to press, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Corpus Christi
court of appeals' decision in Southern Clay Products, Inc. v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assur-
ance, Ltd., 762 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988), rev'd sub. nom., Guardian
Royal Exchange Assurance Ltd. v. English China Clays P.L.C., 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 376 (Feb-
ruary 27, 1991). The Texas Supreme Court accepted the foreign insurer's contention that
assertion of in personam jurisdiction was inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements
of due process. Id. at 377. Justice Mauzy filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 382-83.
12. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W. 2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990).
13. Id. at 356.
14. In Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990), the Texas Supreme Court
recently modified its statement of the jurisdictional test to include the concept of general juris-
diction so that the Texas formula is "as complete an outline of the [federal] constitutional
standard as possible." Id. at 358. The Texas formula now reads as follows:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do
some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or
transaction. Even if the cause of action does not arise from a specific contact,jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are continu-
ing and systematic; and
(3) The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to
the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative
convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum
state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
Id.
15. See TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.069 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1991).
16. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
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ing to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must overcome two
hurdles. First, the non-resident must have established minimum contacts
with the forum state. 17 Second, maintenance of the suit against the non-
resident must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Is
Under the minimum contacts analysis, the court focuses on the non-resi-
dent's purposeful activities in the forum or directed toward the forum.
Based on these activities, the court determines whether it can properly re-
quire the non-resident to defend suit in Texas.19 These activities, whether
direct acts within the forum or conduct outside the forum, must justify a
conclusion that the defendant reasonably expected that he could be sued in
Texas. 20
Minimum contacts may support either specific or general jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant. Specific jurisdiction may be proper if the non-
resident defendant's activities are isolated and yet the cause of action arises
from or is related to the particular activities.2' In a specific jurisdiction case,
the minimum contacts analysis focuses on the relationship between the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation.22 General jurisdiction is proper if the
non-resident defendant maintains continuous and systematic contacts with
the forum state notwithstanding the lack of a direct relationship between the
defendant's contacts and the cause of action.23
The second prong of the due process analysis is separate and distinct from
the minimum contacts inquiry and requires that the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.24 Even if the non-resident defendant has the requisite minimum
contacts, the court must decline to exercise jurisdiction if the prosecution of
the action in Texas would be unreasonable and unfair. 25 The fairness test
requires the court to consider the burden upon the non-resident defendant,
the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff's interest in securing relief, the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution
of controversies, and the states' shared interest in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.26
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
18. Id. As a result of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987), it is clear that this second consideration may
defeat jurisdiction even if minimum contacts exist.
19. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958).
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
21. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
22. Id. at 414.
23. Id. at 414 & n.9.
24. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
25. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (citing Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).




2. The Apparent Deviation from General Principles in the Exercise of
Transient Jurisdiction
This due process analysis may not be necessary or even appropriate when
a non-resident defendant is served with process while present in the forum.27
For thirteen years courts and commentators have disagreed on the meaning
of the United States Supreme Court's statement in Shaffer v. Heitner28 that
"all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
[minimum contacts] standards set forth in International Shoe and its prog-
eny."'29 The impact of the holding in Shaffer on the concept of transient
jurisdiction has been uncertain. The Justices of the United States Supreme
Court are now also decidedly split on the issue. In Burnham v. Superior
Court of California 30 four Justices of the Court, Justices Scalia, White, Ken-
nedy, and the Chief Justice relied on tradition and determined that a non-
resident's temporary presence in a state is a valid basis for personal jurisdic-
tion in a suit unrelated to the non-resident's activities in that state.3' These
Justices found it unnecessary, however, to engage in the due process analysis
dictated by International Shoe Co. v. Washington 32 because the due process
standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice outlined in
International Shoe developed "by analogy to 'physical presence,' -33 and,
therefore, the constitutionality of physical presence is so firmly established in
tradition that the International Shoe analysis is unnecessary.34
Three Justices, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and the Chief Justice, acknowl-
edged that this approach to the due process analysis is different from the
approach in Shaffer, but they refused to acknowledge that the holding con-
tradicted Shaffer.35 They distinguished the problematical language in Shaf-
fer, "that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny,"' 3 6
27. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990).
28. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
29. Id. at 212; see Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2121 nn.4 & 5.
30. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). Petitioner Dennis Burnham, a New Jersey resident, was
served with a California court summons and a copy of Mrs. Burnham's divorce petition while
in California to conduct business and visit his children. Mr. Burnham specially appeared in
California court and moved to quash service. Burnham argued that his few visits to the state
to conduct business and visit his children were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
The trial court denied the motion, and the California appellate court denied mandamus relief.
The court of appeals held that personal service on Burnham during his presence in California
formed a valid basis for personal jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari. 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989).
31. 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
32. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33. 110 S. Ct. at 2115 (emphasis in original).
34. These Justices observed that since International Shoe, the Court has considered only
those due process challenges to the exercise of jurisdiction in a manner different from the
traditions established in the nineteenth century. Id. at 2110. The concept of general jurisdic-
tion, established through continuous and systematic contacts thus developed recently. These
four Justices noted, however, that the exercise of general jurisdiction over defendants based on
contacts unrelated to the cause of action may be proper only as to corporations, not to individ-
uals. Id. n.l.
35. 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
36. 110 S. Ct. at 2115-16.
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by emphasizing that the facts in Shaffer involved quasi in rem jurisdiction.37
Thus, Shaffer, grounded on its facts, held only that all assertions of quasi in
rem jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standards.38 Further,
these Justices concluded that the due process analysis is necessary only when
courts assess new procedures for asserting personal jurisdiction.39
Justice White did not join Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and the Chief
Justice in the portion of the opinion distinguishing Shaffer v. Heitner and
concluding that traditional bases of jurisdiction need not be measured by
contemporary due process standards.4° Rather, Justice White's concurrence
observes that the Court has the authority under the fourteenth amendment
to reexamine traditionally accepted procedures, but unless a litigant demon-
strates that the transient jurisdiction rule is so "arbitrary and lacking in
common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of due
process in every case," attacks on the rule in individual cases should not be
entertained. 41
Four justices, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, con-
curred only in the judgment. Justice Brennan, writing the concurrence, ob-
served that Shaffer mandated that even traditional rules of jurisdiction must
be measured against the standards of International Shoe.42 Therefore, tradi-
tion is not decisive on the issue of whether transient jurisdiction satisfies due
process. Instead, tradition is only relevant to the question43 because it puts a
defendant present in a forum on notice that he is subject to suit there.44 The
transient jurisdiction rule is thus entitled to a strong presumption that it
satisfies due process. 45
Justice Brennan's concurrence further emphasizes that the transient de-
fendant, by visiting another state, avails himself of significant benefits,46 in-
cluding the right to be a plaintiff in the courts of that state.4 7 Because a
transient plaintiff may obtain the benefits of a forum court, a transient de-
fendant should not be immune from that court's authority.48 Finally, the
37. 110 S. Ct. at 2116. During the survey period, the Corpus Christi court of appeals
applied Shaffer to hold that the presence of a bank account in Texas, alone, did not establish
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a Mexican citizen in a suit requesting a bill of discovery. Rami-
rez v. Lagunes, 794 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Cf. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
39. 110 S. Ct. at 2116, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 642. Cf Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt,
779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985), in which the Fifth Circuit applied the due process standard of
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and found that proper service of process
on a nonresident present in the forum gives the defendant notice of the suit and that "is all the
process to which he is due." Id. at 270.
40. 110 S. Ct. at 2119, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 645.
41. 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 645. This all-or-nothing test seems impossible
to meet.
42. Id. at 2120.
43. Id at 2122.
44. Id. at 2124.
45. Id
46. Id. at 2124-25 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
47. 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. IV (privileges and immunities clause)
and Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 n.10 (1985)).
48. 110 S. Ct. at 2125.
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burdens on a transient defendant are slight because of modem transportation
and communication,49 and appropriate procedural devices can ameliorate
any burden that may arise.50 As a result of the preceding due process analy-
sis, the concurrence believed that, as a general rule, it is fair to assert juris-
diction over a non-resident defendant based merely on his presence in the
forum.5'
Justice Stevens refused to join the opinion of the Court for the same rea-
son he refused to join the Court's opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner;52 his fear of
the broad reach of each opinion. Justice Stevens expressed concern in Shaf-
fer that the opinion purported "to decide a great deal more than... neces-
sary .... -53 Regardless whether Justice Stevens' related concerns regarding
Burnham are justified, his position is critical. Given the Court's division,
Justice Stevens' opinion could be the decisive one in any future transient
jurisdiction decision of the the Court.
3. Whether the Non-Resident Defendant is Amenable to Jurisdiction
a. The Application of the General Principles in Texas Federal Courts.
In Gulf Consolidated Services, Inc. v. Corinth Pipeworks, S.A. 5 4 the Fifth
Circuit applied the stream of commerce doctrine55 and upheld the district
court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.5 6 Gulf Con-
solidated Services, Inc. (Gulf), a Texas corporation with its principal office
in Houston, imported and sold pipe under the name of International Materi-
als & Services Co. (IMS). In October 1980, IMS purchased 1,260 joints of
steel oil field casing from Corinth Pipeworks (Corinth), a Greek corporation
with its principal office in Athens, Greece. Corinth warranted to IMS that
the casings were manufactured in accordance with API standards.57
IMS sold sixty-six joints of the casings to a supply company in Midland,
which subsequently sold the casings to Wayman Buchanan. The casings
failed in seven separate locations during drilling operations, causing Mr.
Buchanan to incur substantial additional drilling expenses. Metallurgical
tests indicated that the casings contained defects and thus were not manufac-
tured according to API standards. The Midland supplier reimbursed Mr.
Buchanan for the additional drilling expenses, and Gulf's insurer reim-
49. Id.
So. 110 S. Ct. at 2125.
51. Id. at 2125.
52. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
53. Id. at 219.
54. 898 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1990).
55. The United States Supreme Court has explained: "The forum State does not exceed
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State." WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
56. 898 F.2d at 1073-75.
57. Corinth had a license agreement with American Petroleum Institute (API), a Dallas,
Texas organization, which authorized Corinth to sell API specification pipe.
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bursed the supplier. Gulf then sued Corinth.58 After a bench trial, the dis-
trict court held that Corinth had breached an express warranty that the
casings met API specifications and had breached implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.59
On appeal, Corinth contended that it lacked sufficient contacts with Texas
to be subject to personal jurisdiction. Corinth emphasized that it was a
Greek corporation with its offices and factory in Greece. In addition, Co-
rinth was not registered to do business in Texas or elsewhere in the United
States and maintained no agent, office, or assets in the United States. Co-
rinth also argued that IMS and Corinth negotiated the sale of the casings by
telegram and that the actual sale took place in Greece. Under the terms of
the sale, performance was complete when Corinth delivered the casings to
the ocean carrier in Greece and the risk of loss transferred to Gulf at that
time. All of Corinth's pipe sales to U.S. customers were on similar terms.
Thus, Corinth argued that it had purposely structured its conduct so as to
avoid being haled into a Texas court.
The court rejected Corinth's argument, noting that a sale consummated
outside of Texas can form the basis of jurisdiction. 6° Moreover, physical
contact with Texas is not essential to the proper exercise of jurisdiction. 61
As Corinth delivered the casings into the stream of commerce with the ex-
pectation that only Texas consumers would purchase or use the casings, 62
the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied, and specific jurisdiction
was proper.63
Considering the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction, the court ob-
served that Corinth's burden in defending suit in a legal system greatly dif-
ferent from that of Greece should be given significant weight.64 The court
concluded, however, that the burden on Corinth was justified since Texas
has a demonstrable interest in providing a Texas resident a forum for litiga-
tion arising from injuries caused by a defective product intended for use in
Texas, the state where the defect was discovered and where it caused eco-
nomic injury.65
Judge Reavley disagreed with the conclusion of Judges Gee and Garwood
58. Gulf's insurer, American Motorist Insurance Company (AMI), an Illinois corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Illinois, was the real party in interest and prosecuted
the action against Corinth.
59. 898 F.2d at 1073.
60. Id. (citing Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 197 n.8 (1980)).
61. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
62. Corinth clearly expected that the casings would be used in Texas. Corinth marketed
API oil field casings only in Houston, where Corinth representatives often met customers.
Furthermore, Corinth chartered the ships that transported the casings from Greece to Hous-
ton. 898 F.2d at 1073-74.
63. Id. at 1073. Corinth argued that the stream of commerce doctrine did not apply be-
cause the insurer, the real party in interest, was not affected by the product in the stream of
commerce. The court rejected this contention, noting that Corinth's expectation that it would
be sued in Texas was not changed simply because the consumer's insurer brought the claim.
64. Id. at 1074.
65. Id. at 1074-75. Corinth made over $73 million in sales in the Texas market during a
seven-year period. The court reasoned that any unfairness to Corinth in having to defend a
claim in Texas arising out of one of those sales was minor. Id. at 1075.
19911
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that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over Corinth complied with
due process66 because he did not believe that Corinth had established suffi-
cient minimum contacts with Texas under either a specific or general juris-
diction analysis.67 According to Judge Reavley, the issue was whether, with
respect to the sales contract, Corinth purposefully availed itself of the benefit
and protection of Texas laws.68 He noted that merely contracting with a
Texas resident was insufficient to subject Corinth to personal jurisdiction in
Texas. 69 The court must also evaluate other factors including prior negotia-
tions, contemplated future consequences, terms of the contract, and the par-
ties' actual course of dealing.70 Judge Reavley viewed the contract as an
isolated sale of oil well casing, not a long term relationship with continuing
obligations, and concluded that Gulf had not shown that Corinth created
sufficient Texas contacts to justify an exercise of specific jurisdiction.71
Judge Reavley also compared Corinth's contacts with those of Beech Air-
craft in Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,72 found them to be less extensive and
decided that general jurisdiction was likewise improper.73
Judge Reavley considered the application of the stream of commerce doc-
trine by the majority in Gulf to be inappropriate, pointing out that-the doc-
trine evolved as a means for consumers injured by defective products to
acquire jurisdiction over the manufacturers in product liability actions.74 He
emphasized that the dispute between Gulf and Corinth arose out of a sales
contract, and courts typically have not applied the stream of commerce ra-
tionale in determining jurisdiction in contract disputes.75
The breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose claims in Gulf implicate
the law of product liability, however. The focus of each claim was the fail-
ure of the product to conform to standards, and the stream of commerce
doctrine, contrary to Judge Reavley's conclusion, seems apropos when the
defective product placed in the stream is the subject of the contract.
Moreover, even applying the purposeful availment test Judge Reavley
66. Id. at 1078-83 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
67. IL. at 1078-82.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1079 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79).
70. 898 F.2d at 1079.
71. Id. at 1080.
72. 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987). In Beech the Fifth Circuit held that Texas could
not exercise general jurisdiction over Beech Aircraft, a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Kansas. See Freytag, Bush & George, Conflict of Laws, 42 Sw.L.J. 455,
463-66 (1988).
73. 898 F.2d at 1081-82. Concluding that even if Corinth had established minimum con-
tacts, the exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances was unreasonable. Id. at 1082-83.
Judge Reavley focused on the heavy burden on Corinth to defend in Texas, Corinth's efforts to
structure its relations to avoid the jurisdiction of Texas courts, the minimal interest of Texas in
providing an Illinois insurance company a forum for recovery, and the Supreme Court's direc-
tion to exercise caution in subjecting alien defendants to the jurisdiction of United States
courts. Id. at 108283 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115
(1987)).
74. 898 F.2d at 1078.
75. Id. at 1079.
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considered appropriate, the facts of Gulf support jurisdiction. In Vencedor
Manufacturing Co. v. Gougler Industries, Inc.,76 for example, the First Cir-
cuit considered a manufacturer's shipment of goods to Puerto Rican custom-
ers, who indisputably knew the destination of the product, sufficient to
support jurisdiction in a breach of contract action.77 The court specifically
refused to make a distinction between the jurisdictional principles applicable
to contract and those applicable to tort cases. It observed: "To vary the
minimum contacts needed for jurisdiction according to the character of the
suit would lead plaintiffs into disingenuous manipulation of their pleadings
and would plunge the courts into ever more difficult refinements of the
categories."78
In Bullion v. Gillespie 79 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the general rule that
when the jurisdictional issue is decided on the basis of affidavits, the party
seeking to invoke jurisdiction need only present facts sufficient to constitute
a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.80 Moreover, uncontroverted alle-
gations in the complaint must be taken as true, and the court must resolve
conflicts between the facts alleged and the parties' affidavits in the plaintiff's
favor in determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction
exists.81 The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court erred in Bullion
when it ignored both of these principles.8 2
The issue in Bullion was whether the plaintiff, allegedly injured through
participation in an experimental medical program based in California, could
require the program's non-resident administrator to defend medical mal-
practice and deceptive trade practice claims in Texas. Plaintiff Bullion's
urologist in Texas advised her to purchase a book written by Dr. Gillespie, a
California urologist who was an expert regarding the disease afflicting Bul-
lion. The Texas doctor later contacted Gillespie to review Bullion's problem
and eventually referred Bullion to Gillespie for a personal consultation.
Following a visit to California and a determination that Bullion was a
suitable candidate for the experimental program, Bullion agreed to partici-
pate and returned to Texas. Bullion remained in Texas, and her local doctor
supervised Bullion's progress and reported to Gillespie in California. Gilles-
pie sent to Bullion, in Texas, on three separate occasions, the drug angiostat.
He also sent other correspondence about treatment. Bullion made direct
payments to Gillespie for the angiostat and for medical services.
Bullion sued Gillespie in Texas state court for medical malpractice and
violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,8 3 alleging that she
was injured by a steroid contained in the angiostat. Gillespie removed the
76. 557 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 892.
78. Id. at 894; see also Ben's Marine Sales v. Sleek Craft Boats, 502 A.2d 808, 814-15 (R.I.
1985) (relying on the Vencedor decision).
79. 895 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1990).
80. Id. at 217 (citing WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d. 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989)).
81. Id. (citing D.J. Investments, Inc. v. Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542,
546 (5th Cir. 1985)).
82. 895 F.2d at 217.
83. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
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action to federal court, which granted Gillespie's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.8 4
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the court must
resolve disputed factual assertions in favor of Bullion and that she had estab-
lished a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. 5 Although the facts did
not present a basis for the assertion of general jurisdiction over the non-
resident doctor, Gillespie's contacts with Texas related to the tort in Texas. 6
Bullion's allegations that Gillespie shipped the drugs that proximately
caused her injuries, that Bullion was Gillespie's patient for purposes of the
experimental program, that Gillespie received compensation for her services,
and that Gillespie maintained regular telephone contact with her local doc-
tor and treated other Texas patients as well provided a prima facie case of
specific jurisdiction.8 7
Further, the Fifth Circuit held that requiring Gillespie to defend suit in
Texas was fair and reasonable"8 because Gillespie shipped the experimental
drugs directly to Bullion in Texas and the alleged tort took place in Texas.
The court specifically noted, however, that it was not relying on the stream
of commerce doctrine as Gillespie did not market drugs in Texas.89 Rather,
he made direct mail shipments of the experimental drug to Bullion for direct
consumption.9°
In two separate actions arising from the sale of alumina ceramic rings by
Japanese corporations to a Texas corporation, a Texas federal court denied
both Japanese corporations' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. Houston Technical Ceramics, Inc. (HTC) entered into contracts with
Iwao Jiki Kogyo Co., Ltd. (UK) and Shinagawa Refractories (Shinagawa)
under which the Japanese corporations agreed to supply HTC with alumina
ceramic rings. HTC brought actions against both corporations alleging that
the alumina ceramic rings were defective and did not meet specifications.
In Houston Technical Ceramics, Inc. v. Shinagawa Refractories Co.9, the
court emphasized that Shinagawa not only entered into a contract with
HTC, a Texas corporation, 92 but also sent representatives to Houston to
counsel with HTC and to service existing contracts. Furthermore, Shina-
gawa advertised in Texas, and Shinagawa representatives made numerous
business trips to Texas. Thus, the court concluded that these deliberate acts
established personal jurisdiction.93
84. 895 F.2d at 215.
85. Id. at 217-18.
86. Id. at 216. Specific jurisdiction may be proper even if the non-resident defendant has
never physically been in Texas. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
87. Id. at 217.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 217 n.8.
90. Id.
91. 745 F. Supp. 406 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
92. A contract with a foreign entity is one factor to consider in the jurisdictional analysis,
although the contract by itself does not automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts.
Id. at 408 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1985)).
93. 745 F. Supp. at 408.
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In Houston Technical Ceramics, Inc. v. Iwao Jii Kogyo Co.94 the uncon-
troverted allegations and affidavit evidence established contacts by IJK suffi-
cient to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction." IJK visited
Texas first to solicit HTC's business and later to service its contracts with
HTC. Further, UK knew that Texas companies would buy and use the alu-
mina ceramic rings as component parts.96 Moreover, IJK solicited addi-
tional Texas business and intended to maintain a longterm market in Texas
for its products.97
The court distinguished Loumar, Inc. v. Smith 98 in which the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a Maryland corporation that sold an allegedly defective air-
craft part to a Texas corporation by mail order did not have sufficient
minimum contacts to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 9 The IJK
court noted that, in contrast to the single transaction at issue in Loumar,
HTC contracted with IJK for a series of shipments to be made for a period
in excess of one year. 10° The transaction between IJK and HTC was more
substantial than the single mail order transaction in Loumar, and IJK's con-
tacts with Texas were more significant than those of the Maryland corpora-
tion in Loumar.10 1
Having determined that IJK had minimum contacts to support the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction, the court examined whether the assertion of ju-
risdiction was fair and reasonable.10 2 The court considered the burden upon
UK, the interest of Texas, and HTC's interest in obtaining relief. 103 The
court noted that IJK already conducted extensive business in other states
and that it was not unfair to require IJK to defend a suit in Texas. 104 More-
over, Texas had an interest in having the case litigated in Texas because of
the potential financial damage to Texas business. 10 5 Finally, HTC, a small
business located only in Houston, was not financially capable of pursuing
litigation in Japan. 10 6 Because IJK had sufficient minimum contacts and the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over IJK would not offend traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice, the court denied IJK's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.10 7 Neither Shinagawa nor Iwao Jiki
94. 742 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
95. Id. at 391.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983).
99. 742 F. Supp. at 390.
100. Id at 391.
101. Id. at 390-91.
102. Id. at 391.
103. Id. at 390-91. The court held the other factors generally considered in the fairness
analysis were inapplicable to a foreign corporation like IJK. Id at 391.
104. 742 F. Supp. at 391.
105. Id. The court pointed out that Texas would have a greater interest in a personal
injury case; financial damage alone, however, suffices. Id. at n.1 (citing WNS, Inc. v. Farrow,
884 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989) (involving franchise contract dispute)).
106. 742 F. Supp. at 391.
107. Id at 391-92. The court cited the following cases in support of its decision: Bullion v.
Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1990) (nonresident doctor who shipped drugs to
Texas patient subject to personal jurisdiction); WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 202-03
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Kogyo specifically mention the stream of commerce doctrine, though each
relies in part on a stream of commerce case.10 8
A non-resident whose only relevant contacts are acts performed for the
benefit of his employer may successfully assert in an action against him indi-
vidually that a Texas court lacks personal jurisdiction. In Saktides v.
Cooper'0 9 the court applied the fiduciary shield doctrine, which provides
that an individual's business transactions within a state solely as a corporate
officer do not create personal jurisdiction over the individual. 110 The fiduci-
ary shield doctrine is an equitable, not a constitutional, doctrine."'
Although some courts have stated that the doctrine does not apply when the
state's long-arm statute has been held to extend to the limits of due process,
the Cooper court considered the fiduciary shield doctrine a necessary sub-
issue of the due process analysis." 12
Plaintiffs alleged that O'Brien, an account executive at Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. (Dean Witter) in Reno, Nevada, negligently handled money be-
longing to Texas National Realty Corporation and made possible the
money's fraudulent conversion by other defendants. Plaintiffs argued that
O'Brien subjected himself to the jurisdiction of Texas courts by engaging in
activities in Nevada that had reasonably foreseeable consequences in Texas.
O'Brien filed an affidavit that stated that he had lived in Nevada since 1977
and began his employment with Dean Witter in 1978. O'Brien further al-
leged that he had very limited contacts with Texas, having been in Texas on
military duty for two weeks and no more than four times on personal busi-
ness unrelated to the litigation. O'Brien denied having any form of continu-
ous and systematic business in Texas and stated that a telephone call to one
of the plaintiffs in Thailand was his only contact with the plaintiffs. Most
important, O'Brien stated that, at all times, he dealt with the plaintiffs while
in the course and scope of his employment with Dean Witter.
The court granted O'Brien's motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
(5th Cir. 1989) (nonresident franchise applicants established sufficient jurisdictional contacts in
Texas); Micromedia v. Automated Broadcast Controls, 799 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1986)
(foreign corporation established sufficient minimum contacts in Texas by contracting with
Texas buyer); Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir.
1984) (Washington manufacturer had sufficient jurisdictional contacts with Louisiana under
the stream of commerce doctrine).
108. See Shinagawa, 745 F. Supp. at 408 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)); Iwao Jiki Kogyo, 742 F. Supp. at 391 (citing Bean Dredging
Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1984)).
109. 742 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
110. Id. at 385 (citing Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985)). The
corporation, however, is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id.
111. Id. at 385 (citing Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981))("The fiduciary shield doctrine is not a constitutional principle, but is rather a doctrine based
on judicial inference as to the intended scope of the longarm statute."); 742 F. Supp. at 385 n. I
(quoting Midland Bank, 664 F.2d at 902).
112. 742 F. Supp. at 385. To avoid the application of the fiduciary shield doctrine, a plain-
tiff need only allege in good faith that the individual acted to advance his own, rather than his
employer's, interests. Id. at 386. The fiduciary shield doctrine generally does not apply upon a
finding that the individual is merely the alter-ego of the corporation. Id. (citing Stuart v.
Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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diction. 113 The court applied the fiduciary shield doctrine to both the spe-
cific and general jurisdiction analyses and rejected both bases for
jurisdiction.' 14 The court concluded that requiring employees who do busi-
ness by telephone or mail with several states to defend lawsuits in their indi-
vidual capacity in those states based on acts performed for their employer's
benefit would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. 115
In Psarianos v. Standard Marine, Ltd. 116 the federal district court deter-
mined that it had both general and specific jurisdiction over a foreign protec-
tion and indemnity club.1 17 Eagle Transport Ltd., Inc. (Eagle) a closely held
Liberian corporation with its principal place of business in New York, was
actively engaged in the shipping business until the late 1970s. Due to a de-
cline in the industry, Eagle began to sell its major assets, and by the early
1980s, the Thomas K was the only ship remaining in Eagle's fleet. Eagle
later decided to sell the Thomas K as scrap metal to a buyer in Japan. Eagle
hired a captain and crew in preparation for the voyage and arranged for the
necessary examinations to enable the vessel to sail in compliance with Amer-
ican Bureau of Shipping (ABS) rules.
The Thomas K left Port Arthur, Texas in December 1983 and temporar-
ily docked in Florida to pick up cargo for delivery to a Japanese corporation.
The vessel then left for Japan, but in late January the ship encountered
heavy seas and bad weather causing its exterior shell to separate. The ship
began to take on water, and despite attempted repairs, the Thomas K sank
on February 1, 1984. Eight crew members died. Seven crew members sur-
vived but sustained various injuries. When the ship sank, Eagle had liability
insurance with the United Kingdom Protection & Indemnity Club (the
Club), which was organized under the laws of Bermuda.
The surviving crew members and the survivors of the deceased crew mem-
bers filed personal injury and wrongful death actions against Eagle and
others. The defendants filed third party claims against the Club, alleging
that the Club breached its insurance contract. The Club moved to dismiss
the third party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 1 8
Addressing the issue of whether the Club had sufficient minimum contacts
with Texas such that it could reasonably anticipate being sued in Texas, the
court first engaged in a general jurisdiction analysis, considering all of the
113. 742 F. Supp. at 387.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 387 (citing Bowers v. NETI Technologies, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 349, 358 (E.D. Pa.
1988)).
116. 728 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
117. Id. at 448.
118. Initially, the trial court severed the third party complaint from the main action. After
the trial of the main action to a jury, the court reconsolidated the third party action with the
main suit. 728 F. Supp. at 443. Also, the court consolidated a companion case brought by the
Japanese corporation to recover for the loss of cargo aboard the Thomas K with the main suit,
and the Club asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as to both the third party claims and those
of the foreign corporation.
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Club's activities in Texas.' 19 From 1980 until 1989, other vessels insured by
the Club regularly called at various Texas ports. From 1979 through 1985,
the Club issued payments to Texas claimants on seventy-seven separate oc-
casions for matters including cargo loss or damage, collisions, and personal
injuries. From 1980 through 1986, partners and employees of the Club were
present in Texas for fifty days for business purposes, including marketing
and solicitation. The court also noted that the Club insured Texas compa-
nies, and the Club paid its correspondent attorneys directly in Texas. 120
These attorneys performed various services in Texas on behalf of the Club
and its insureds.
The Club argued that neither the Club nor any of its employees were li-
censed to do business in Texas, nor did they maintain offices, bank accounts,
or property in Texas, or advertise in any Texas publications. The Club also
argued that its contacts were not those of the Club itself but those of its
members or correspondent agents and therefore of no consequence in a due
process analysis. 12' The court rejected these arguments, concluding ample
evidence existed to establish general jurisdiction in Texas over the Club.' 22
The Club also argued that since Texas has no statute providing for a direct
suit by a plaintiff against an insurance company, it had no reason to antici-
pate being haled into a Texas court. The court rejected this argument also,
holding that the quantity and quality of contacts, not the existence or ab-
sence of a direct action statute, determined whether the Club could reason-
ably anticipate being sued in Texas. 123 According to the court, the Club
should have foreseen being involved if an indemnity dispute arose in Texas
because the Club knew that its insured vessels routinely frequented Texas
ports, and the Club insured Texas risks. Therefore, the court confirmed that
general jurisdiction existed over the Club.' 24
In a somewhat labored analysis, the court also found that specific jurisdic-
tion existed.125 Yet, the court did not fully explain how the cause of action
arose from or was related to the Club's Texas activities. The court noted
that the Club knew of the Thomas K's status at the Port Arthur berth and
that changes in the insurance contract occurred while the ship was in
119. 728 F. Supp. at 444-46.
120. Id at 445.
121. The Club relied upon Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958): "The unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State." 728 F. Supp. at 446.
122. Id. at 447. The court discussed three cases upholding personal jurisdiction over for-
eign protection and indemnity clubs in reaching its result. 728 F. Supp. at 446-47; see Puerto
Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 668-69 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); McKeithen v. M/T Frosta, 435 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. La. 1977); Travelers In-
demnity Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1987), modified on rehearing on
other grounds, 836 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1988).
123. 728 F. Supp. at 447. The Club also relied upon stream of commerce cases to bolster
its contention that it could not reasonably anticipate being sued in Texas. The court distin-
guished the case before it from product liability cases because P&I insurers can contract to
exclude liability. When they do not, they should foresee being sued. Id
124. Id.
125. Id. at 447-48.
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Texas. 126 It observed that the Club's reasons for denying coverage related
directly to Eagle's and ABS' alleged acts and omissions while the Thomas K
was in Port Arthur.127 None of these factors demonstrate convincingly,
however, a connection between the cause of action and the activities. More-
over, the court seemed to lapse again into general jurisdiction analysis when
it considered, as relevant to its specific jurisdiction holding, the number and
frequency of visits by Club insured vessels to Texas, the extensive work of
correspondent law firms, the presence of Club policyholders in Texas who
pay premiums from Texas, and the Club's insurance of Texas related risks,
including the Thomas K.128 The court's specific jurisdiction analysis thus
seems questionable.
A Texas federal court examined a fact pattern remarkably similar to the
facts of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 129 in Igloo Products Corp. v. The
Mounties, Inc. 130 Igloo Products Corp. (Igloo), a Texas corporation, filed
an action against The Mounties, Inc. (The Mounties) based upon a contract
under which The Mounties, in 1987, became Igloo's sales representative in
Oregon and Washington. The Mounties filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
The court noted that, like the parties in Burger King, who contracted for a
long-term relationship, Igloo and The Mounties had entered into successive
contracts for a period of at least thirteen years. 13' The contracts provided
that Texas law would apply.132 The court also emphasized that Texas was
Igloo's principal place of business, and The Mounties and Igloo conducted
business in Texas by mail and by telephone. 133 The Mounties regularly sent
checks directly to Igloo's Texas office and participated in several meetings in
Texas directly related to the contract in question. The Burger King court
considered all such factors relevant to a proper assertion of jurisdiction, and
the Texas court found that Burger King controlled the personal jurisdiction
issue in Igloo. 134
b. The Application of the General Principles in Texas State Courts,
In Matthews v. Proler 135 the court of appeals held that a Texas attorney
126. Id at 448.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff was a Texas resident and that Texas' inter-
est in protecting its own residents is relevant to jurisdiction. Id. (citing De Melo v. Toche
Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1272 (5th Cir. 1983)). The court further observed that the Club
had taken certain steps to protect its interest in the litigation between the plaintiffs and Eagle.
In fact, the Club's counsel had attended the entire trial to ensure that Eagle presented a bona
fide defense. Id at 448-49.
129. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
130. 735 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
131. Id.
132. In Burger King the contract provided that the law of Florida, the jurisdictionally chal-
lenged state, would apply.
133. 735 F. Supp. at 216.
134. Id. The court abstained from hearing the case and transferred the action to Oregon,
however, based on the pendency of a related action filed by The Mounties against Igloo. Id. at
218.
135. 788 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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could not recover legal fees from a non-resident client because the attorney
did not meet his burden of showing that the contract was to be performed in
Texas.' 36 Following the client's failure to pay fees, the attorney brought an
action against the client for breach of contract and recovery in quantum
meruit. The client specially appeared, 137 and the trial court dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction.138
The court found that the client was not a Texas resident, was not required
to designate or maintain a registered agent for service in Texas, and did not
maintain a place of business in Texas. 139 As the client met his burden to
negate the attorney's allegations of jurisdiction in Texas, the burden shifted
to the attorney to demonstrate that the client purposely availed himself of
the benefits and protections of Texas laws. 140
Although the parties indisputably entered into the contract in Texas, the
trial court concluded that the agreement was to be performed in Wiscon-
sin. 14 1 Upholding the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the
court of appeals distinguished the tort and contract provisions of the Texas
long-arm statute. 42 The court noted that while proof that a non-resident
committed a purposeful act in Texas is sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a
tort action, the proof that a non-resident enters into a contract in Texas,
standing alone, is insufficient. ' 43
The Dallas court of appeals, in Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Han-
son, 44 reversed the trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
because the pleadings and affidavits of the non-resident defendant were not
sufficient to negate jurisdiction. 45 Electronic Data Systems Corp. (EDS)
alleged that Hanson, a North Carolina resident, promised to pay EDS
$9,000 at its offices in Dallas, Texas. As EDS met its burden of pleading
sufficient allegations to bring Hanson within the provisions of the long-arm
statute, 46 the burden shifted to Hanson to present evidence to negate all
136. Id. at 174.
137. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
138. 788 S.W.2d at 173.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 174.
141. Id. at 173-74. The attorney argued that the contract for legal services was performed
in part in Texas. The court acknowledged that it was doubtful that a Texas attorney handling
a case in Wisconsin would not do at least a portion of the work at his Texas office. Id. at 174.
No statement of facts was recorded at the special appearance hearing, however. Therefore, the
court presumed that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support all findings of fact
necessary to support the judgment and refused to substitute its own subjective determination
for that of the trial judge. Id.
142. Id. at 174-75. In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a non-
resident does business in this state if the non-resident:
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to
perform the contract in whole or in part in this state;
(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.
TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(1), (2) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
143. 788 S.W.2d at 175.
144. 792 S.W.2d. 506 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
145. Id. at 508.
146. EDS alleged that Hanson purposefully engaged in business in Texas by entering into a
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bases of personal jurisdiction. 147 Hanson did not appear and testify, nor did
she produce any witnesses in support of her claim of lack of jurisdiction.
The court rejected Hanson's argument that her pleadings and ex parte affida-
vit were sufficient to establish lack of jurisdiction, noting that neither was
competent evidence to support a special appearance. 148 The court, there-
fore, held that Hanson failed to meet her burden of showing lack of amena-
bility to long-arm process, and the trial court erred in sustaining Hanson's
special appearance'.149
4. Whether Service of Process is Proper
In Wilson v. Dunn 150 the Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must
strictly comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) service require-
ments to obtain a default judgment based on substituted service.151 This rule
applies even if the defendant has actual knowledge of the lawsuit.1 52 Wilson
brought a personal injury action against Dunn, and after several months of
unsuccessfully attempting to serve Dunn at his apartment, Wilson's attorney
filed a motion for substituted service under rule 106(b). Wilson's motion
was not verified or supported by affidavit as rule 106(b) expressly requires. 5 3
The trial court, however, granted the motion and ordered that the citation be
served upon Dunn either by attaching it to his apartment door or by deliver-
ing it to his apartment manager.15 4 The trial court specifically instructed the
clerk to attach a note to the docket sheet stating that no default judgment
was to be taken.155 The return of citation stated that it had been delivered to
the defendant's agent for service, Dunn's apartment manager. Dunn actu-
ally received the papers and hand-delivered them to his insurance agent.
The insurance adjuster and Wilson's attorney agreed that, pending efforts
to settle Wilson's claim, Wilson would not require Dunn to fie an answer in
contract with a Texas resident which was to be performed in whole or in part in Texas. See
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
147. Id. at 507 (citing Read v. Cary, 615 S.W.2d. 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d. 595, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1968, no writ).
148. Ide at 508.
149. Id.
150. 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990).
151. Id. at 836.
152. Id.
153. Rule 106(b) states:
Upon motion supported by affidavit stating the location of the defendants'
usual place of business or usual place of abode or other place where the defend-
ant can probably be found and stating specifically the facts showing that service
has been attempted under either (a)(l) or (a)(2) at the location named in such
affidavit but has not been successful, the court may authorize service
(1) by leaving a true copy of the citation, with a copy of the petition attached,
with anyone over sixteen years of age at the location specified in such affidavit,
or
(2) in any other manner that the affidavit or other evidence before the court
shows will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(b) (emphasis added).




the case. They also agreed that no default judgment would be taken without
ten days notice. Nearly two years after the accident, the parties had yet to
reach a settlement. Following a conversation with Dunn, Wilson's attorney,
distrustful of the insurance adjuster, went to the trial court to obtain a de-
fault judgment. The attorney requested the file from the clerk to take it to
another judge for hearing on his request for a default judgment. Although
the clerk hesitated because of the attached note prohibiting a default judg-
ment, she eventually gave the file to Wilson's attorney. Prior to the hearing
before another judge, Wilson's attorney removed the note from the file and
threw it away. After the hearing, the judge rendered a default judgment for
Wilson in the amount of $475,000.00.156
After Dunn learned of the default judgment, he filed a motion for new
trial. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Dunn had received
actual notice of the suit and that his failure to file an appearance was his
insurer's fault.157 The court of appeals reversed, holding that service was
defective and could not support the default judgment. 158
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The
court noted that, regardless whether a defendant has notice, Texas law pros-
cribes talking a default judgment absent strict compliance with the rules of
civil procedure service requirement. 159 The court held that service on Dunn
was defective because it was not properly authorized without the requisite
affidavit. 16
In contrast to the rigid application of rule 106 in Wilson, the Texas
Supreme Court, in Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Insurance
Co.,' 6 1 held that, when an officer's return of service of process does not recite
the proper method of service but the record affirmatively demonstrates a
proper form of service and contains an order tantamount to formal amend-
ment of the return of citation, service is sufficient. 162 In Higginbotham the
court rendered a default judgment against two insurance companies that ac-
tually received citation but did not file an answer because the citations were
erroneously placed in the wrong file rather than forwarded to the corporate
attorney. 63 The return on the citations reflected that they were served at
12:01 p.m. on Tuesday, March 18, 1986. The insurance companies filed mo-
tions for new trial, asking the court to set aside the default judgments be-
156. Id. at 835. After the default judgment was awarded, Wilson's attorney told the judge
that he had removed the note from the file because Dunn had actual knowledge of the suit and
default was therefore appropriate. The judge chastised Wilson's attorney for his tactics but did
not set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court did not comment on the attorney's
behavior.
157. Id. at 835.
158. Id. at 836-37.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 836. The court noted that the express requirement of an affidavit in support of a
motion for substitute service was added in 1981. Since that time the courts have consistently
held that substitute service may not properly issue on a motion supported by an affidavit that is
conclusory or otherwise insufficient. Id.
161. 796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990).
162. Id. at 697. TEx. R. Civ. P. 118 provides for amendment of citations.
163. 796 S.W.2d at 696.
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cause of improper service. The trial court overruled the motions, finding
service proper under article 3.64 of the Insurance Code, the relevant statu-
tory provision in 1986.164
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause for trial, holding
that, although the record reflected the time and date of service, it did not
affirmatively show service at either company's home office during business
hours. 165 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on the
grounds that the trial court's finding that service was proper under article
3.64 necessarily also found that service was made during business hours.166
The court emphasized that it had not retreated from its rule that failure to
strictly comply with the rules of civil procedure governing service of process
renders the attempted service invalid and a default judgment improper.167
The court observed that the citation return alone in Higginbotham would
have been insufficient to show valid service.' 68 The court limited its holding
to situations involving a record that showed strict compliance with a valid
method of service and an order expressly or implicitly amending the return
of citation. 169
Four justices dissented from the majority holding. 170 Writing the dissent-
ing opinion, Chief Justice Phillips stated that the defendants were amenable
to service under two statutes, but plaintiffs complied with neither. 71 Article
2.11 of the Texas Business Corporations Act provides that a domestic corpo-
ration may be served by delivering process to its president, any vicepresi-
dent, or its registered agent, 172 and the return of service on General Life and
Accident Insurance Company stated that Joyce Brown was the defendant's
registered agent. The record, however, established that Ms. Brown was not
the company's registered agent. Moreover, the return of service on National
Benefit Life Insurance Company did not even state Joyce Brown's capacity.
Plaintiffs did not comply with article 3.64173 because nothing in the re-
turns indicated that "3900 S. FWY" was either company's home office.' 74
164. Id. Article 3.64 provides:
Process in any civil suit against any "domestic" company, may be served only
on the president, or any active vice president, or secretary, or general counsel
residing at the city of the home office of the company, or by leaving a copy of
same at the home office of such company during business hours.
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.64 (repealed 1987) (currently Tax. INS. COonE ANN. art. 1.36)(Vernon Supp. 1991) [hereinafter art. 3.64].
165. 750 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1989), rev'd, 796 S.W.2d 695 (rex.
199o).
166. 796 S.W.2d at 696. The Court also noted that the trial court could properly take
judicial notice that 12:01 p.m. on March 18, 1986, was early on Tuesday afternoon and not a
statutory holiday. TEx. RL EVID. 201(b), (c).
167. 796 S.W.2d at 697 (citing Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linnen Supply Co., 690
S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 697-700.
171. Id. at 698-99.
172. See TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1980).
173. See art. 3.64, supra note 164.
174. 796 S.W.2d at 699. In Mahon v. Caldwell, Haddad, Skaggs, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 769,
771 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ), the court of appeals held that provision of the
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Moreover, the recitals in the petition failed to prove that service was effected
on the defendants at their home office as required by article 3.64.175 The
dissent also emphasized that, contrary to the majority holding, a return of
citation cannot be amended by implication. 176
Despite the disclaimer by the majority in Higginbotham, the court did
indeed change the rules. 177 The requirement of strict compliance with the
rules of service of process is now modified, and the amendment by implica-
tion holding invites courts to deviate from over a century of established law.
The date of service of process relates back to the date of filing only if the
plaintiff exercises diligence in effecting service. 178 In Gant v. DeLeon,179 the
Texas Supreme Court held that the unexplained failure to serve process on a
defendant for periods totalling more than three years established lack of dili-
gence as a matter of law.180 Plaintiffs filed suit on April 8, 1981, but did not
serve the defendant until July 7, 1987, more than six years after plaintiffs
had filed suit.18'
The trial court granted Gant's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the plaintiff failed to exercise diligence and thus the applicable
two-year statute of limitations barred his claims. 18 2 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that the summary judgment proof raised a
fact issue concerning the plaintiff's diligence in effecting service.'8 3 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed, observing that the uncontroverted summary
judgment proof established that the plaintiffs failed to obtain service on the
defendants during three extended periods in the six years it took the plain-
tiffs to accomplish service.18 4 Thus, the record established failure to use dili-
gence as a matter of law.'3 5
non-resident's sole recorded place of business satisfies the requirement that the Secretary of
State receive the name and address of the non resident's home office. The court based its
holding on the fact that the contract between the parties that was admitted into evidence
contained only one business address. Id. at 771.
175. 769 S.W.2d at 699. The trial court made a finding of fact that this address was the
home office based on evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing. The dissent
emphasized, though, that such postjudgment evidence could not supply the necessary informa-
tion lacking in the record when the judgment was signed. Id. (citing Cox Marketing, Inc. v.
Adams, 688 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ)).
176. 769 S.W.2d at 699-700.
177. Id. at 699.
178. Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Zale Corp. v.
Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam)).
179. 786 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1990).
180. Id. at 259.
181. July 7, 1987 was also almost eight years after the automobile accident, the subject of
the suit, occurred.
182. 786 S.W.2d at 259. See TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon
1986). To bring suit within the two-year limitations period prescribed by § 16.003, a plaintiff
must not only file suit within the applicable limitations period but must also use diligence to
have the defendant served with the process. Rigo Mfg. Co. v. Thomas, 458 S.W.2d 180, 182
(Tex. 1970).
183. DeLeon v. Gant, 773 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989), rey'd, 786
S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1990).
184. 786 S.W.2d at 260. Specifically, plaintiffs did nothing from June 12 to December 31,




B. Whether to Exercise the Personal Jurisdiction that Exists
According to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court has the discre-
tion to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends
of justice would be better served if the action were brought and tried in
another forum. 186 In a major decision, Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro,187 a
majority of the Texas Supreme Court determined that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens does not apply in statutory personal injury and death
cases."8 ' Rather, a foreign plaintiff has an absolute right to bring suit in
Texas under section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. 189 The court based its decision on its interpretation of section 71.031
as containing a statutory abolition of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The court found support for this interpretation in its previous refusal of writ
in a 1932 case, Allen v. Bass,190 which had interpreted the predecessor of
section 71.031 to grant a foreign plaintiff an absolute right to bring a proper
suit in Texas. 191 The Alfaro case spawned two concurrences and four dis-
sents, each with a written opinion. 192
The dispute in Alfaro arose between Costa Rican employees of the Stan-
dard Fruit Company and Dow Chemical Company (Dow) and Shell Oil
Company (Shell), both of which are incorporated in Delaware but author-
ized to do business in Texas. The employees claimed that they suffered se-
vere medical problems, including sterility, as a result of exposure to a
pesticide manufactured by Dow and Shell. The employees filed a petition in
Texas state court, alleging that the court had jurisdiction under the prede-
cessor to section 71.031. Both section 71.031 and its predecessor provide
that a foreign citizen may enforce a personal injury or wrongful death action
186. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 507 (1947).
187. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
188. Id. at 679.
189. Section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:
(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this
state, of the United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts
of this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing the death of
injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right to
maintain an action for damages for the death or injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws
of this state for beginning the action; and
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has equal
treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.
(b) All matters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or maintenance of
the action in the courts of this state are governed by the law of this state.
(c) The court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate
under the facts of the case.
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986) [hereinafter § 71.031].
190. 47 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1932, writ ref'd).
191. 786 S.W.2d at 678. The predecessor to § 71.031, supra note 189, was Revised Stat-
utes, § 1, art. 4678, 1925 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. 2, 1283, amended by Act of May 29, 1975, ch.
530, § 2, 1975 Tex. Gen Laws 1381, 1382, repealed by Civil Practice and Remedies Code, ch.
959, § 9, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3322 [hereinafter article 4678].
192. Justices Hightower and Doggett issued concurring opinions. Justices Phillips, Gonza-
lez, Cook and Hecht issued dissenting opinions. 786 S.W.2d at 679-708.
1991)
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in Texas under certain conditions. 193 After trying unsuccessfully to remove
the suit to federal court, Dow and Shell attacked the trial court's jurisdiction
and also contended that the court should dismiss the case under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.
The trial court, although finding jurisdiction, dismissed the case on forum
non conveniens grounds.194 The Houston court of appeals reversed, holding
that Texas courts have no authority to dismiss a personal injury or wrongful
death claim under section 71.031 on that basis. 195
The supreme court affirmed, concluding that the Texas legislature statuto-
rily abolished the doctrine offorum non conveniens when it enacted the pred-
ecessor to section 71.031.196 The court thus was compelled to establish that
the doctrine of forum non conveniens existed in Texas before enactment of
that predecessor statute in 1913. To attempt to do so, the court cited four
early cases in which the courts refused to exercise jurisdiction. 197 None of
these cases, however, used the term forum non conveniens.198 Nonetheless,
the court determined that the doctrine existed prior to 1913.1 99 The court
further determined that the language in section 71.031 and its predecessor,
providing that a personal injury action "may be enforced in the courts of this
state," is mandatory, and does not allow a trial court to dismiss an action
under section 71.031 based on forum non conveniens, thus abolishing the
doctrine by statute.2°°
The court relied upon its refusal of writ of error in Allen v. Bass20 to
bolster its interpretation of section 71.031. In Allen the court held that the
predecessor statute gave citizens of a neighboring state the absolute right to
maintain a suit under that statute in a Texas court.20 2 According to the
Alfaro court, the Allen court clearly addressed and rejected the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in the context of the predecessor statute.20 3 As the
Texas Supreme Court refused the application for writ of error in Allen, the
193. See TEx. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986). Section 71.031,
supra note 189, contained no substantive change from its predecessor, article 4678, supra note
191. The Supreme Court thus determined that § 71.031 governed the instant case. 786
S.W.2d at 675 n.I.
194. 786 S.W.2d at 674.
195. Alfaro v. Dow Chemical Co., 751 S.W.2d 208 (T'ex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988),
aff'd., 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
196. 786 S.W.2d at 678-79.
197. See Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Godair Comm'n Co., 87 S.W. 871 (1905, writ
ref'd); Southern Pacific Co. v. Graham, 34 S.W. 135 (1896, no writ); Mexican Nat'l R.R. v.
Jackson 33 S.W. 857 (1896, no writ); Morris v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 14 S.W. 228 (1890).
198. Two commentators have observed that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
originated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 512 (1947). See Robertson & Speck,
Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and
Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 948-49 (1990).
199. 786 S.W.2d at 677.
200. Id. at 678-79. Justice Hightower, in concurrence, encouraged the legislature to amend
§ 71.031, supra note 189, if it did not intend the statute and its predecessor to abolish the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 786 S.W.2d at 680.
201. 47 S.W.2d 426 ('ex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1932, writ ref'd).
202. 786 S.W.2d at 678. Allen involved a dispute between a New Mexico plaintiff and a
New Mexico defendant arising out of an accident occurring in New Mexico.
203. 786 S.W.2d at 678.
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Alfaro court decided that its interpretation of section 71.031 was controlled
by that refusal. 204 A close reading of Allen puts immediately at issue, how-
ever, the court's conclusion that Allen clearly addressed and squarely re-
jected the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Justices Gonzalez and Hecht wrote the most extensive dissenting opin-
ions.205 Both attacked the majority's view that the legislature had abolished
forum non conveniens in 1913 by pointing out that the court itself recently
observed that the applicability of forum non conveniens to an article 4678
(predecessor to section 71.031) suit was an open question.2°6 Both Justices
emphasized that section 71.031 does not confer upon foreign litigants an
absolute right to bring suit in Texas; rather, courts should construe the stat-
ute as permissive. 20 7 The authors agree.208 Justices Gonzalez and Hecht
predicted, respectively, that, if the legislature fails to reinstate the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, Texas will become "an irresistible forum for all mass
disaster lawsuits"209 and "the courthouse for the world." 210
Justice Gonzalez noted that the legislature provided no indication that it
sought to abolishforum non conveniens when it enacted the predecessor stat-
ute to section 71.031 in 1913 because the doctrine itself did not exist in the
state until after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil v.
Gilbert.211 The predecessor statute merely gave Texas citizens the right to
maintain an action without threat of dismissal under the dissimilarity
doctrine.212
Furthermore, Justice Gonzalez observed that Allen is not conclusive on
204. Id. The Texas Supreme Court's refusal of writ of error indicates that the judgment of
the court of appeals was correct and the principles of law declared in the opinion were cor-
rectly determined. Texas Rules of Form app. A at 48 (7th ed.).
205. Justice Doggett wrote a separate concurrence specifically to attack the dissenters,
who, in his opinion, advocated a doctrine that would immunize "multinational corporations
from accountability for their alleged torts causing injury abroad . . . ." 786 S.W.2d at 681.
Justice Doggett's concurrence indicates, however, that he actually believes less that the doc-
trine has been abolished than that it should be, id. at 689, and in effect, supports accomplishing
by judicial fiat what the legislature permitted but did not mandate.
206. 786 S.W.2d at 691 n.3, 706 (citing Couch v. Chevron Int'l Co., 682 S.W.2d 534, 535
(Tex. 1984) (per curiam)); Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872, 876 (Tex. 1962).
207. 786 S.W.2d at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (trial courts have inherent authority to
applyforum non conveniens in appropriate cases); id. at 707 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (forum non
conveniens, appropriately exercised, does not preclude courts from receiving cases they ought
to hear. Rather, it enables courts to avoid cases under circumstances basically unfair to the
defendants, the public, or both.)
208. Chief Justice Phillips pointed out in his dissent to the opinion of the court overruling
the Motion for Rehearing that the amendment to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
providing that the court's exercise of jurisdiction over direct appeals is discretionary, directly
conflicts with its opinion in Alfaro. Both § 71.031 and the statute authorizing direct appeals
use the term "may." Chief Justice Phillips properly observed that "may" cannot be
mandatory in one instance and not in the other. 786 S.W.2d at 709.
209. Id. at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 707 (Hecht, J., dissenting). Justice Phillips stated in his dissent that he
"lack[ed] the prescience to foretell whether dire consequences [would] follow." 786 S.W.2d at
689-90. Justice Cook's dissent observed that the plaintiffs in Alfaro "hit pay dirt in Texas."
Id. at 697.
211. Id. at 694 (citing Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)). See supra note 198.
212. Some courts refuse to enforce actions for personal injury or wrongful death when the
applicable law is too dissimilar from the law of the forum. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COM-
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the issue of the application of forum non conveniens to section 71.031 be-
cause the Allen court did not address the doctrine of forum non conveniens
(or engage in the balancing of the public or private interests it demands) but
rather applied the doctrine of comity. 213 After proposing guidelines for a
forum non conveniens analysis, 214 Justice Gonzalez concluded that only the
legislature may abolish the doctrine of forum non conveniens, an act which it
absolutely has not yet performed. 2 15
Justice Hecht observed that Texas is the first state to reject absolutely the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.216 Moreover, supreme courts in states
with statutes similar to section 71.031 have interpreted the term "may" as
permissive.217 In Justice Hecht's opinion, Alien is feeble precedent and
should be overruled.218 Justice Hecht observed that the majority gave
neither authority nor policy reasons for abolishing the doctrine offorum non
conveniens.219 His rhetorical questions deserve answers. Among those ques-
tions are these: 1) "Why... should Texas be the only state in the country,
perhaps the only jurisdiction on earth, possibly the only one in history, to
offer to try personal injury cases from around the world?" 220 and 2) "What
advantage for Texas does the Court see, or what advantage does it think the
legislature envisioned, that no other jurisdiction has ever seen, in abolishing
the rule of forum non conveniens for personal injury and death cases?" 221
The supreme court's action in Alfaro, combined with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in In re Air Crash Disaster222 that the federal law of forum non
conveniens applies in diversity cases, will undoubtedly increase the number
of attempted removals from state to federal court so that defendants can rely
upon the federal law of forum non conveniens. This procedure is perhaps
unnecessary in state court maritime cases, but some uncertainty exists.
Judge Gee's recent opinion in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo 223 stated
that the reverse Erie doctrine requires state courts to apply federal forum
non conveniens law in maritime cases. 224 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision on other grounds, observing that, while "[i]t may be
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 49 n.5 (2d ed. 1980). Texas law has abandoned the
dissimilarity doctrine. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
213. 786 S.W.2d at 694 (citing McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, writ dism'd)).
214. 786 S.W.2d at 695-96.
215. Id. at 697.
216. Id. at 703 n.6. Nine states, while not adopting the doctrine, have not rejected it
outright.
217. Id. at 705, discussing statutes in Kansas, Iowa and Alabama.
218. Id. at 706. Justice Hecht emphasized that no other court has followed Allen, and two
courts have expressly rejected it. Id.; see McNutt v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ dism'd); ForcumDean Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 341 S.W.2d
464, 465-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ dism'd). Chief Justice Phillips agrees
that Allen should be overruled. 786 S.W.2d at 689.
219. 786 S.W.2d at 706.
220. Id. at 707.
221. Id.
222. 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987).
223. 817 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988), vacated and
remanded, 849 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1988).
224. Id. at 309.
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that the respondents' reading of the preemptive force of federal maritime
forum non conveniens determinations is correct ...." they need not reach
the issue.225 Maritime cases may thus be an exception to theAlfaro holding.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit, in Ikospentakis v. Thalassic Steamship
Agency,226 recently refused to approve a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of a
maritime suit in federal court and subsequent refiing in a state court in Lou-
isiana, which does not recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine in mari-
time cases, because despite the statement in Choo that state courts must
apply federal law in maritime cases, Louisiana courts have refused to accept
Judge Gee's pronouncement.227 The panel in Ikospentakis thus noted that
the defendants in Ikospentakis would be guinea pigs in the state court.228
Whether Texas state courts will adopt Judge Gee's analysis in Choo and
apply the federal law of forum non conveniens in maritime cases in state
court in the face of the Alfaro decision remains an open question.
In Hotvedt v. Schlumberger, Ltd.229 the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's dismissal of a diversity action by a Canadian citizen and a California
resident against Schlumberger Technology Corporation (STC), a Texas cor-
poration and Schlumberger, Ltd. (SL), its parent corporation, onforum non
conveniens grounds. Hotvedt, a Canadian citizen and California resident,
was exposed to radioactive isotopes during his employment with SL in Bra-
zil. Hotvedt originally filed suit in California state court, which dismissed
the action against SL for lack of personal jurisdiction and stayed the action
against STC on the grounds offorum non conveniens.230 Instead of pursuing
STC in Venezuela or Brazil, as the California court directed, Hotvedt filed
suit in Texas state court. The defendants removed the action to federal
court, and the Texas federal court dismissed the action against STC on stat-
ute of limitations grounds and against SL on forum non conveniens
grounds. 231
With regard to the forum non conveniens dismissal, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that because STC, allegedly the most culpable defendant, was a
wholly owned subsidiary of SL, it would be fair to make SL defend the ac-
tion in Texas.232 In fact, requiring the plaintiffs to file suit against SL in
Brazil or Venezuela would be an abuse of discretion.233 The Fifth Circuit
did not mention the Alfaro decision, even though it would apparently be
applicable to Hotvedt's personal injury claims.
The most interesting part of the Hotvedt decision, however, concerns its
225. 486 U.S. at 147. The Chick Kam Choo holding was reaffirmed in Ikospentakis v.
Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1990).
226. 915 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1990).
227. Id. at 178. The other two panel members did not join in Judge Gee's opinion that
federal forum non conveniens law applies in state court.
228. Id. at 180; cf Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1990)
(case dismissed with prejudice on forum non conveniens grounds).
229. 914 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1990).
230. Id. at 80.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 82.
233. Id.
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holding related to the Texas savings clause, which provides a period of time
for tolling the applicable statute of limitations until the refiling of a lawsuit
when the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.234 The Fifth Circuit
stretched the savings clause to apply to the situation in Hotvedt, although the
California court originally stayed the action against STC on the basis offo-
rum non conveniens.235 Even though the California court had jurisdiction
and a literal reading of the savings statute would preclude its applicability to
these facts, the Fifth Circuit determined that the court "effectively did not
have jurisdiction because it used the doctrine of forum non conveniens to
avoid the imposition of its jurisdiction. '236 The Fifth Circuit's conclusion is
questionable because the California court actually had jurisdiction but de-
clined to exercise it. This distinction is an important one. No adequate ra-
tionale appears for the court's application of the savings statute on these
facts, and the court's opinion adds confusion to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
II. WHICH LAW APPLIES
A. Choice of Law in Transfers under 28 US.C. § 1404(a).
The United States Supreme Court, in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,237 held
that the rule established in Van Dusen v. Barrack 238 applies both to plaintiffs
and defendants. The Court focused primarily on convenience and the inter-
est of justice and minimized the impact of manipulative forum shopping. A
transferee court must therefore apply the transferor court's choice of law
rules after a section 1404(a) transfer initiated by either a defendant or a
plaintiff.239
Ferens was injured on his farm in Pennsylvania while working with a
combine manufactured by John Deere. 240 Ferens did not file a tort suit dur-
ing Pennsylvania's two year limitations period. During the third year fol-
lowing the accident, Ferens instituted a diversity action against John Deere
234. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 1986) states the following:
(a) The period between the date of filing an action in a trial court and the date
of a second filing of the same action in a different court suspends the running of
the applicable statute of limitations for the period if:
(1) because of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court where the action
was first filed, the action is dismissed or the judgment is set aside or
annulled in a direct proceeding; and
(2) not later than the 60th day after the date the dismissal or other
disposition becomes final, the action is commenced in a court of proper
jurisdiction.
(b) This section does not apply if the adverse party has shown in abatement
that the first filing was made with intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction.
235. 914 F.2d at 82-83.
236. Id. at 82.
237. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and O'Connor.
238. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Under Van Dusen, a transferee court must apply the transferor
court's choice of law rules to a defendant-initiated § 1404(a) transfer.
239. 110 S. Ct. at 1280.
240. John Deere Co. was a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in
Illinois.
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in Pennsylvania federal court, raising contract and warranty claims for
which the Pennsylvania limitations period had not run. Ferens also fied a
second diversity suit against John Deere in federal court in Mississippi, al-
leging negligence and product liability claims, to take advantage of Missis-
sippi's six year statute of limitations applicable to tort claims.241
Ferens then filed an unopposed motion to transfer the Mississippi action
to Pennsylvania federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) on the ground that
Pennsylvania was a more convenient forum. The Mississippi court trans-
ferred the action to the federal court in Pennsylvania, 242 and the Penn-
sylvania district court consolidated the transferred tort action with the
pending contract and warranty action.243 The Pennsylvania court ruled,
however, that because Ferens moved for transfer as a plaintiff, the Van Du-
sen rule requiring application of the transferor court's choice of law rules to
a defendant-initiated section 1404(a) transfer did not apply.2" Thus, the
district court refused to apply the Mississippi statute of limitations and dis-
missed Ferens' tort action on the grounds that the Pennsylvania two-year
limitations period barred it.245 The Third Circuit upheld the district court's
dismissal of the tort action, ruling that a transferor court's choice of law
rules do not apply following a transfer under section 1404(a) on a motion by
a plaintiff.2 "
The United States Supreme Court quoted extensively from Van Dusen 247
and applied the three policies asserted there to determine that Van Dusen's
rationale applies whether the movant is plaintiff or defendant.248 First, sec-
tion 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state law advantages that exist
absent diversity jurisdiction. That is, a party should have the same advan-
tages in a section 1404(a) diversity suit in the forum as in a state court suit in
the forum.249 The Van Dusen Court recognized the danger of subjecting a
plaintiff's venue privilege and resulting state law advantages to the defend-
241. Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941), the Mississippi
court exercising diversity jurisdiction in Ferens was required to apply Mississippi's choice of
law rules. Under those rules, Pennsylvania substantive law would control the personal injury
claim, but Mississippi law would govern the limitation period. 110 S. Ct. at 1278. See Miss.
CODE ANN. § 15149 (1972).
242. 110 S. Ct. at 1278.
243. Id.
244. Id
245. Id. (citing Ferens v. Deere & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Pa. 1986)).
246. 110 S. Ct. at 1279 (citing 862 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1988)). Initially, the Third Circuit
affirmed on a different theory that applying Mississippi's statute of limitations would violate
due process because Mississippi had no legitimate interest in the case. 110 S. Ct. at 1278
(citing Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987)). The United States Supreme
Court vacated the decision after its ruling in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988),
which held that a state may apply its own statute of limitations to claims governed by the
substantive laws of another state without violating either the full faith and credit clause or the
due process clause. 110 S. Ct. at 1279. On remand, the Third Circuit ruled that the Van
Dusen rule did not apply to a § 1404(a) transfer by a plaintiff. Id. (citing 862 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.
1988)).
247. 110 S. Ct. at 1279.
248. Id. at 1280.
249. Id; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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ant's control through successful transfer.250 Weighing the relative consider-
ations, the Ferens Court decided that application of the law of the transferee
state would deprive the plaintiff of his state law advantages but would only
deprive the defendant of the advantage of forcing the plaintiff to litigate in
Missippii.251 The Court held that application of the transferee court's law
would thus undermine Erie by changing the state law applicable to a diver-
sity case.252
Second, the Court in Ferens held that applying the transferor state's law to
plaintiff-initiated 1404(a) transfers did not contravene Van Dusen's policy
against forum shopping because applying the transferor court's law would
not give a plaintiff an opportunity to obtain a choice of law that he could not
already obtain through his initial forum selection. 253 Moreover, the plaintiff
could have also shopped for Mississippi law in Mississippi state courts.254
Finally, the Van Dusen policy that a decision to transfer under section
1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience rather than on the
possibility of prejudice resulting from a change in the applicable law requires
application of the law of the transferor state in plaintiff-initiated transfers.
255
One reason behind Van Dusen's ruling that a transfer of venue by the de-
fendant does not result in a change of law was to eliminate the necessity for
the court to expend extensive judicial time and resources in determining the
prejudice to the plaintiff.256 The Ferens Court held that the same policy
requires application of the transferor law when a plaintiff initiates a trans-
fer.257 Moreover, section 1404(a) exists for the benefit of the witnesses and
interest of justice, and the entire judicial system should not suffer for the
benefit of punishing an arguably manipulative plaintiff.258
The Court observed that although applying the transferee law under the
facts of Ferens might be simple, such a rule would leave uncertain which law
should apply when both parties move for a transfer of venue or when the
court transfers venue on its own motion.259 The Court thus held that fore-
sight and judicial economy favor application of the transferor law regardless
whether the plaintiff or the defendant makes the 1404(a) motion.26" The
Court so ruled even though the rule applied here allowed Ferens to have
250. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964).
251. 110 S. Ct. at 1280-81, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 449-50.
252. 110 S. Ct. at 1281, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 450. Furthermore, the Court noted that Ferens
would not have moved to transfer had he known that the Pennsylvania court would dismiss
the action. Id. The authors believe that the plaintiff's tactical maneuver does not require such
deference. Moreover, the court's comment that if John Deere had moved to transfer, Missis-
sippi law would apply, is at best tangential.
253. 110 S. Ct. at 1282.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1282-83.
256. Id. (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964)).
257. 110 S. Ct. at 1283, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 452. If the law were to change following a
plaintiff-initiated transfer, a trial court would similarly be reluctant to grant a transfer prejudi-
cial to the defendant. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1283-84.
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both his choice of law and choice of forum and even seemed to reward him
for his arguably manipulative conduct.261 The Court specifically declined to
develop sophisticated federal choice of law rules for diversity cases because
state conflict of law rules are sufficient to ensure that appropriate laws apply
to diversity cases. 262
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun joined. 263 Justice Scalia focused on the Rules of Deci-
sion Act,2 6 4 which, as interpreted in Erie, requires a federal court to apply
the law of the state in which it sits. 265 Justice Scalia viewed the issue before
the Court as whether section 1404(a) alters the "principle of uniformity
within a state" established by Erie and Klaxon.266 He emphasized that by
bringing suit in the Mississippi federal court en route to suit in the Penn-
sylvania federal court, Ferens sought to obtain application of a different sub-
stantive law in federal than in state court by use of a Pennsylvania federal
court, where the transferor law of Mississippi would apply, instead of a
Pennsylvania state court, where Pennsylvania law would apply. This result
is the one Klaxon was designed to prevent. 267
B. Choice of Law in Contract Actions
1. Choice of Law and Forum Selection Clauses
In DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.268 the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its
opinion and judgment entered nearly two years earlier 269 but reached the
same result on the choice of law issue: Texas law governed a noncompetition
clause in a contract for the performance of services in Texas, notwithstand-
ing that the contract provided for the application of Florida law.2" 0 The
court did, however, engage in a much more extensive and therefore more
accurate choice of law analysis than in the earlier decision.
In August 1981 DeSantis, who had a career in the field of international
and corporate security services, accepted a position as the Houston area
manager of Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut), a Florida company that
261. 110 S. Ct. at 1284. The court focused on the result, rather than the means of ob-
taining the result, and noted that permitting the Pennsylvania and Mississippi actions involv-
ing the same issues to be simultaneously pending in different district courts would lead to the
waste of time, energy, and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1284-88.
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
265. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
266. 110 S. Ct. at 1288. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941),
the Supreme Court held that in diversity cases, a federal court must follow the conflict of laws
rules prevailing in the state in which it sits. The Court reasoned that bringing suit in a federal
court should not allow a plaintiff to achieve a result different than would be achieved by filing
in state court.
267. 110 S. Ct. at 1286. A Pennsylvania state court would not apply the Mississippi six-
year statute of limitations. The dissent also observed that the file-and-transfer ploy would cost
the federal courts more time than it would save. 110 S. Ct. at 1287-88.
268. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
269. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut, 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 616 (July 13, 1988).
270. 793 S.W.2d at 681.
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specializes in providing security guards for businesses. At Wackenhut's re-
quest, DeSantis signed an agreement that, for the duration of his employ-
ment with Wackenhut and for two years thereafter, he would not compete in
any way with Wackenhut in a forty county area in south Texas. DeSantis
also agreed not to divulge any confidential or proprietary information ac-
quired through his employment with Wackenhut. Finally, the parties agreed
"that any questions concerning interpretation or enforcement of [the] con-
tract shall be governed by Florida law."'271
In March 1984 DeSantis resigned from Wackenhut under threat of termi-
nation. Thereafter, DeSantis formed Risk Deterrence, Inc. (RDI) to pro-
vide security consulting services and security guards to a small number of
clients. One month following his resignation, DeSantis sent letters to twenty
or thirty businesses, some of which were Wackenhut clients, announcing his
new company. Although DeSantis expressly disclaimed in these letters any
intent to interfere with existing contracts with Wackenhut, one of Wacken-
hut's clients terminated its contract with Wackenhut and signed a five-year
contract with RDI.
In October 1984 Wackenhut sought to enjoin DeSantis and RDI from
violating the noncompetition agreement. Wackenhut also sought damages
for breach of the agreement.272 At trial, the jury found that DeSantis
breached the covenant not to compete. 273 The trial court applied Florida
law, the law chosen by the parties, and held the noncompetition clause valid
but overly broad. 274 Thus, the court permanently enjoined DeSantis from
competing with Wackenhut in a limited area and from divulging Wacken-
hut's client list or proprietary information. 27" The court of appeals
affirmed.2 76
The Texas Supreme Court first considered whether to apply Texas law or
the Florida law selected by the parties to determine the enforceability of the
noncompetition agreement. 277 This issue was one of first impression. 278 The
court recognized that contracting parties may agree that the law of a partic-
ular state will apply to the contract, 279 but the chosen law must bear a rela-
271. Id. at 675.
272. Wackenhut alleged that DeSantis and RDI used confidential client and pricing infor-
mation obtained through DeSantis' employment with Wackenhut. DeSantis and RDI coun-
terclaimed. DeSantis alleged that Wackenhut fraudulently induced him to sign the
noncompetition agreement, that the agreement violated state antitrust laws, and that enforce-
ment of the agreement by temporary injunction was wrongful and tortiously interfered with
DeSantis and RDI's contractual and business relationship.
273. 793 S.W.2d at 676.
274. Id. at 674-75. The trial court concluded that irreparable harm to Wackenhut was
either presumed from DeSantis' breach of the agreement under Florida law or established as a
matter of law because of the absence of an adequate legal remedy for breach of the agreement
under Texas law. Id. at 676.
275. The trial court denied all relief DeSantis and RDI requested based upon the jury's
finding that DeSantis had breached his agreement. 793 S.W.2d at 676.
276. Id. at 675.
277. Id. at 677.
278. Id.
279. Id. This conflict of laws concept is referred to as "party autonomy." Id. (citing RUS-
SELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 26971 (1971)). Texas has
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tionship to the agreement or the parties and not contravene the public policy
of the forum.280
The court based its analysis on section 187 of the Restatement, which de-
scribes the circumstances under which the court may apply the parties'
choice of law.28 1 Section 187(2)(b) required the court to determine 1)
whether Texas had a more significant relationship than Florida to the parties
and their transaction; 2) whether Texas had a materially greater interest
than Florida in determining the enforceability of the noncompetition agree-
ment; and 3) whether application of Florida law would conflict with Texas
public policy. 2 2 In its earlier opinion, the court leaped to the third factor
without analyzing the first two.283 In the opinion after rehearing, it ana-
lyzed all three factors. The court noted that the parties executed the con-
tract in Texas and concluded that the focus of the agreement was the
performance of personal services in Texas.284 Under section 196 of the Re-
statement, the latter factor alone is normally conclusive.285 Thus, the court
found that Texas had the most significant relationship to the parties and the
transaction. 286
The court also concluded that Texas had a materially greater interest than
Florida in deciding whether the noncompetition agreement should be en-
forced. The court noted that Florida's interest was in protecting a national
business headquartered in Florida. On the other hand, Texas was directly
interested in DeSantis as a Texas employee, Wackenhut as a national em-
ployer doing business in Texas, RDI as a new Texas business, and Texas
consumers of the services provided by the parties.287
Finally, the court determined that applying Florida law would contravene
a fundamental policy of Texas. The court noted that enforcement of non-
competition agreements is a fundamental policy of Texas and concluded that
to apply Florida law to determine the enforceability of such an agreement
under the circumstances presented in DeSantis would contravene this pol-
icy.288 In the withdrawn opinion, the court had painstakingly compared
Texas and Florida law. The court had concluded that because Florida law
"differed so significantly," its application would contravene public policy. 289
In this opinion, the court arguably mandated that, regardless the law of the
recognized the party autonomy rule. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a)(Vernon
Supp. 1991); see also First Commerce Realty Investors v. KF Land Co., 617 S.W.2d. 806, 808-
09 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (express agreement of par-
ties regarding choice of law enforceable if contract bears reasonable relation to chosen state
and no countervailing public policy of the form demands otherwise).
280. 793 S.W.2d at 677.
281. RESTATEMEN-r (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
282. 793 S.W.2d. at 678.
283. See Freytag, George & McCoy, Conflict of Laws, 44 Sw.L.J. 489, 509 (1990).
284. 795 S.W.2d at 679.
285. Id. at 678-79 n.4.
286. Id. at 679.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 680-81.
289. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 620.
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other state, Texas law applies. 29°
The Dallas court of appeals, in Resource Savings Association v. Neary,291
rejected an argument that the federal full faith and credit clause requires
Texas courts to give effect to foreign statutes that conflict with Texas law
and upheld the parties' contractual choice of Texas law.292 A Texas general
partnership, Dimension-Lang Georgia Partners, obtained a loan from Re-
source Savings Association (Resource) in 1985. The partnership delivered a
promissory note in the amount of $11 million, secured by a deed to secure
debt on real property in Georgia. Two of the partners, Neary and Lang,
executed an unconditional guaranty securing repayment of the note.
Both the guaranty and the promissory note contained choice of law provi-
sions. The guaranty stated unambiguously that all rights, obligations, and
liabilities arising under the guaranty would be construed according to Texas
law. The note stated that any questioned or challenged provision of the note
or of any document securing the indebtedness would be construed in accord-
ance with whichever applicable federal or Texas law would uphold or en-
force the challenged or questioned provision. The note also contained an
exception that Georgia law would govern procedural and substantive mat-
ters relating only to creation, perfection, and enforcement by the holder of
its rights and remedies against the Georgia property securing the debt.
The partnership defaulted, and Resource filed suit in Texas against Neary
and Lang based on the guaranty. Neary and Lang ified a general denial, and
Resource subsequently moved for summary judgment. Before the hearing
on the motion for summary judgment, Resource foreclosed on the Georgia
property securing the partnership debt and purchased the property at a non-
judicial foreclosure sale, applying the proceeds as a credit against the
debt.293 Neary and Lang then filed a motion for summary judgment, assert-
ing that Resource failed to comply with a Georgia statute requiring a judicial
order confirming the sale before a party can sue for a deficiency. 294 The trial
court granted Neary and Lang's motion for summary judgment and denied
Resource's motion for summary judgment.295
On appeal, Resource argued that the Texas lawsuit sought to enforce rem-
edies against the guarantors, Neary and Lang, and therefore, the trial court
erred in granting Neary and Lang's motion for summary judgment based on
the application of Georgia law. The appellate court agreed. 296 The court
rejected Neary and Lang's argument that even if Texas law applied, Re-
source's failure to obtain confirmation of the sale extinguished the debt and
290. 793 S.W.2d at 681.
291. 782 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
292. Id. at 903.
293. The partnership went into bankruptcy following the default. Resource obtained relief
from the automatic stay in the partnership's bankruptcy case to foreclose on the property. Id.
at 898.
294. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161 (Michie 1990). The statute provides that a party
must seek a judicial order confirming a foreclosure sale within 30 days after the sale before
suing for a deficiency judgment.
295. 782 S.W.2d at 899.
296. Id. at 899, 902.
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therefore the guarantors were not liable on the debt.297 According to the
court, that argument failed because it presumed, incorrectly, that Georgia
law would apply in the first instance and that Georgia law would extinguish
the remaining debt.298
The court also rejected Neary and Lang's argument that the full faith and
credit clause of the federal Constitution required the application of Georgia
law. 299 The court of appeals noted that although the full faith and credit
clause preserves rights acquired under the public acts and judicial proceed-
ings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states, the
full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute another
state's conflicting law for its own.30° The court pointed out that literal en-
forcement of the full faith and credit clause would lead to the irrational re-
sult that a court could not enforce any laws of the forum state that conflicted
with those of another state, while courts of the other state would be man-
dated to enforce the conflicting laws of the forum state.301
The court thus focused on the parties' contractual choice of Texas law
except in actions involving the real property in Georgia. The court deter-
mined that no public policy precluded application of Texas law because
Texas law could not possibly be in conflict with any policy of the forum,
Texas. 302 The court then turned to a determination of the law chosen by the
parties to govern the particular dispute and whether the contract bore a rea-
sonable relationship to the chosen law.30 3 The court concluded that the par-
ticular dispute was an action to enforce Resource's legal remedies against the
guarantors, not an action seeking enforcement of Resources' remedies
against the Georgia property. 3°4 Therefore, pursuant to the note and guar-
anty, the court applied Texas law.30 5
The court also concluded that the contracts bore a reasonable relationship
to Texas because the partnership that executed and delivered the note was a
Texas partnership, Resource was a Texas savings and loan association 16-
cated in Dallas, Texas, the indebtedness was payable at a Resource office in
Dallas, the guarantors were Texas residents, and the guarantors agreed that
their obligations under the guaranty were performable in Dallas County and
waived the right to be sued anywhere but Dallas County. Accordingly, the
297. Id. at 899-900.
298. Id. The court interpreted the Georgia statute to preclude a suit for deficiency not to
extinguish the debt. Id. at 899.
299. Id. at 900-01. Neary and Lang relied upon Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145 (1932), but the court concluded that this case actually supported Resource's position
that Texas law applied.
300. Id. at 901.
301. Id. at 901 (citing Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939)).
302. 782 S.W.2d at 902.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 902-03.
305. Id. The construction of the guaranty and note were questions of law for the court,
and the court concluded that the parties clearly intended that Texas law would govern except




court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Neary and Lang and remanded the case.306
Caton v. Leach Corp. 307 illustrates the principle of depacage, that different
states' laws may apply to separate issues in lawsuits involving multiple
claims. Caton, a Texas resident, worked for twenty-two years as an em-
ployee and sales representative for Leach Corporation (Leach), a manufac-
turer of electronic and mechanical products for use in the aerospace
industry. Leach is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in California.
In 1983, Caton, who had been working as an independent representative
for Leach since 1973, entered into a sales representative agreement with
Leach.308 The agreement provided that the contract "shall be construed
under the laws of the State of California" and further provided that Leach
would pay Caton on a commission basis. At the time of the agreement,
Caton was Leach's exclusive representative for the sale of relay switches in
Texas.
During 1984, Caton notified Leach that General Dynamics, a purchaser of
relay switches for the F16 aircraft, expected a large order from the govern-
ment. Through Caton's efforts, Leach received quotation requests from
General Dynamics for relay switches for the government project and bid to
supply over $12,000,000.00 of relay equipment by June 15, 1985.
In a May 14, 1985, letter Leach notified Caton that it would terminate the
sales representative agreement in thirty days, two days before the switches
were to be supplied. Caton brought an action against Leach to recover dam-
ages in contract and tort as well as restitution. Caton maintained that he
had solidified Leach's position as a General Dynamics supplier and that his
efforts in fulfilling his sales representative responsibilities contributed signifi-
cantly to Leach's obtaining the General Dynamics contract.
Leach moved for summary judgment based on a provision of the agree-
ment giving either party the express right to terminate the agreement upon
thirty days notice, and the trial court granted Leach's motion. 309 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit first addressed whether California or Texas law applied to
each of Caton's claims. Regarding the contract claims, the court applied the
Texas rule enforcing contractual choice of law clauses if the chosen law
bears a reasonable relationship to the parties and the contract and does not
contravene Texas policy. 310 As the choice of law clause provided that the
agreement would be construed under California law and Texas has adopted
the rule that parties may contract with regard to the law applying to con-
306. 782 S.W.2d at 903-04. Although Resource prayed for rendition on appeal, the court
could not render judgment for Resource because Resource did not appeal from the denial of its
motion for summary judgment; rather, it appealed only from the granting of Neary and Lang's
motion for summary judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 74(d), (f). Thus, the proper disposition
was reversal of the judgment below and remand for further proceedings. 782 S.W.2d at 904.
307. 896 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1990).
308. Caton served as a company employee for approximately ten years and became an
independent sales representative for Leach in 1973.




struction of an agreement, 311 the Fifth Circuit held that California law gov-
erned both Caton's breach of contract and breach of implied contract
claims. 312
The choice of law clause provided, however, for the application of Califor-
nia law only to construe the contract. The clause did not provide for a par-
ticular state's law to govern the rights and liabilities of the parties with
respect to noncontractual claims. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit applied the
most significant relationship test to determine the law applicable to the tort
and restitution claims.313
Although Caton and Leach agreed that Texas law should be applied to the
noncontractual claims, the court engaged in a limited analysis of the facts to
demonstrate that Texas had the most significant relationship.3 14 The court
then concluded that Texas law applied to Caton's claims for breach of good
faith and fair dealing315 and restitution.316
The Fifth Circuit approved the trial court's issuance of an injunction to
uphold a forum selection provision in an agreed judgment 317 in Seattle-First
National Bank v. Manges.318 In the agreed judgment, the defendants prom-
ised to pay the bank $30,000,000.00 and further agreed that any suit that
could potentially impair the enforcement of the judgment must be brought in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San
Antonio Division. The defendants defaulted, and the bank obtained an or-
der from the district court directing the seizure and sale of the property
securing the debt.
Subsequently, several of the defendant entities filed bankruptcy in the
Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division. The bank sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to restrain the de-
fendants from initiating proceedings that would impair enforcement of the
agreed judgment in any forum other than the Western District. The district
court granted the preliminary injunction. 31 9 The defendants appealed, con-
311. Id. at 943.
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLc'r OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971) (providing for application of
most significant relationship test in tort cases)).
314. 896 F.2d at 943. Although Leach was a foreign corporation, Caton, a Texas resident,
worked for Leach in Texas and solicited sales from Texas companies. The court also empha-
sized that Texas has a significant interest in providing a tort remedy to a Texas citizen. Id.
315. As Texas does not recognize a tort duty of good faith in the employer/employee con-
text, Caton could not recover on this claim. Id. at 948-49.
316. Id. Section 221 of the Second Restatement applies the most significant relationship
test to determine the applicable law for restitution claims. The factors considered in the analy-
sis regarding the tort claims also led the court to apply Texas law to the restitution claim. The
fact that Leach received the benefit of Caton's efforts in Texas as well as Texas' interest in
applying its restitution policy to a transaction that enriched a foreign corporation at the ex-
pense of a Texas citizen were important considerations. Id. at 943.
317. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1990).
318. 900 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1990).
319. Id. at 798. The district court entered three orders. The first granted a preliminary
injunction continuing in effect the TRO. The second ordered defendants to seek transfer of the




tending that the district court abused its discretion in granting the prelimi-
nary injunction to enforce the negotiated choice of venue provision
contained in the agreed judgment. The defendants also contended that the
district court's order violated the automatic stay provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.320 They argued further that the bankruptcy court in the
Southern District, not the district court in the Western District, should de-
cide the effect of the venue selection clause.
The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments.321 The court determined that
the defendants did not demonstrate that the clause was invalid as a product
of fraud or overreaching or that enforcement of the clause would deprive
defendants of a forum for their bankruptcy proceedings. 322 Furthermore,
the court held that the defendants waived venue in the Southern District by
agreeing to the venue selection clause. 323 Thus, the district court properly
issued the injunction enforcing the forum selection provision and properly
ordered the defendants to transfer their bankruptcy proceedings to the West-
ern District of Texas.324
A contractual forum selection clause was also the decisive factor in favor
of a transfer under the federal venue statute to the jurisdiction contractually
selected by the parties in Brock v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc. 325 The
plaintiff in Brock entered into a franchise agreement with defendant Entre
Computer Center (Entre) for the operation of computer stores in Texas and
Louisiana. A clause in the franchise agreement provided that any action
brought by either party in either federal or state court would be brought in
Virginia.
The plaintiff franchisees, as other Entre franchisees across the country,
received numerous complaints from the buying public and failed in their
endeavor.326 The plaintiffs filed a diversity action in Texas federal district
court, claiming fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The defendants moved to transfer the action to the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia on the basis of the forum selection clause.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the forum selection clause
320. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1990).
321. 900 F.2d at 798-99.
322. Id. at 799. Such circumstances would overcome the prima facie validity of a forum
selection clause. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
323. 900 F.2d at 799 (citing Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1068 (5th Cir.
1986) (parties may waive bankruptcy venue provisions)). The court further noted that venue
was proper in the Western District of Texas because an affiliate of the defendants was involved
in bankruptcy proceedings in the Western District. 900 F.2d at 799. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2)
(West Supp. 1990) (venue proper in any district where affiliate of debtor involved in bank-
ruptcy proceedings).
324. 900 F.2d at 799-800. The district court's first order, however, did not state the rea-
sons for its issuance and was not sufficiently specific. Thus, the court remanded the case to the
district court to conform the injunction to the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
325. 740 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
326. Other franchisees brought similar claims against Entre in various federal courts. In
each of the cases, the defendants filed motions to transfer based on the contractual forum
selection clause, and in each instance, the district courts enforced the clause contained in the
contract and transferred the cases to the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 430, 432.
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was unenforceable and that venue was proper in Texas. First, the court
noted that two courts had rejected the argument that forum selection clauses
do not cover tort claims, including one court construing the same clause
contained in the Entre contract.327 Second, the court held that the forum
selection clause applied to all parties to the contract, whether signatories or
not.328 Third, the court determined that the forum selection clause was en-
forceable because the franchise agreement, not the clause, was fraudulently
induced. 329 The fraud exception applies to a venue selection clause only
when its inclusion is itself the product of fraud or coercion.330
Having determined the validity of the forum selection clause, the court
addressed the motion to transfer. Although a strong presumption ordinarily
exists in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, the fact that the parties
contractually stipulated that any suit must be brought in Virginia effectively
neutralized this presumption. 33 1 The convenience factors considered in the
venue analysis proved inconclusive, as the location of the witnesses and evi-
dence did not significantly favor either Texas or Virginia as a forum. The
fact that the plaintiffs retained Kansas attorneys who had litigated several of
the other pending suits against Entre in the Eastern District of Virginia, and
therefore already had certain documents in their possession, mitigated
against the plaintiffs. 332 Finally, the court pointed out that a transfer served
the interests of justice because the Eastern District of Virginia had received
transfers of several cases against Entre presenting similar issues, and the
amount of litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia was substantially less
than in the Eastern District of Texas.33 3 Thus, the court ordered the case
transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia. 334
Had the franchise agreement not contained the forum selection clause, the
plaintiffs could have maintained their suit in Texas. Brock's lesson is that in
a case in which the convenience factors do not clearly favor either party, a
valid forum selection clause will eradicate any presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's choice of forum.
2. Choice of Law in Actions Involving Insurance Contracts
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. 335 the trial court ruled
that it was not required to make a choice of law decision because "the basic
principles of policy construction in each jurisdiction [Texas and New York]
327. Id. at 430 (citing Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1071
(11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988)); Ste-
phens v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 636, 638 (N.D. Ga. 1988)).
328. Id. at 430-31.
329. Id. at 431. Plaintiffs relied on M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972).
330. 740 F. Supp. at 431; see Seherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974).
331. 740 F. Supp. at 432; see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981).
332. Id. at 432.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 433. The court, therefore, did not address Entre's argument that it did not have
the requisite minimum contacts with Texas for the Texas court to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over the individual defendants.
335. 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990).
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are the same."'336 The Fifth Circuit disagreed. 337 In Grace several in-
dependent Texas school districts brought a strict liability and negligence ac-
tion against asbestos manufacturers seeking recovery for the cost of
replacing asbestos-containing materials installed in several school buildings
throughout Texas. The manufacturers, including W.R. Grace (Grace), filed
third party complaints against their primary and excess insurers. Grace and
the school districts settled, and the district court granted Grace's motion for
summary judgment against the insurers. 338
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in several respects,
including its choice of law analysis. 339 The insurers asked the district court
to apply New York law, and the district court refused, reasoning that it was
not required to make a choice of law because of the similarity of law in both
jurisdictions.340 The Fifth Circuit observed, however, that New York and
Texas law differ on many issues, and in other areas the law of New York is
unclear and could arguably be resolved differently than under Texas law.341
First, the Fifth Circuit held that a conflict existed between New York law
and the law applied by the trial court as to whether allegations of an under-
lying claim determine a duty to indemnify. 342 Second, as New York courts
have not determined how the term "property damage" should be applied for
the purpose of imposing insurance coverage, it was error for the district
court to decide this issue. 343 Third, New York law on the trigger of cover-
age issue either conflicted with the law the district court applied or was at
least unsettled in that area.344 Finally, New York law on the insurers' non-
disclosure defense either conflicted with the law the district court applied or
was unclear. 345 Thus, the district court abused its discretion in retaining
ancillary jurisdiction over these issues.346
Erie347 requires that a federal district court apply state law when the law
of different jurisdictions directly conflicts or when the law is unclear. Thus,
the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in its failure to apply the
Texas choice of law rule 348 to determine which state had the most significant
336. Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1406. (E.D.
Tex. 1988).
337. 896 F.2d at 873.
338. Id. at 867-68.
339. Id. at 872-73.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 873.
342. Id. at 874-75. The law applied by the federal district court is not the law of Texas,
which measures a duty to indemnify by the acts of the insured not the allegations against him.
The latter measures a duty to defend. See Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919, 923 (5th Cir.
1965) (under Texas law, an "insurer does not pay because [the insured] is alleged to be legally
responsible but because [the insured] has been adjudicated to be legally responsible."); Ameri-
can Alliance Ins. Co. v. FritoLay, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, error
dismissed) (under Texas law, duty to defend distinct from duty to indemnify; duty to indem-
nify based on actual facts, not on pleadings).
343. 896 F.2d at 875.
344. Id. at 875-76.
345. Id. at 876-77.
346. Id. at 877.
347. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
348. Id. at 873. Texas applies the most significant relationship test.
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relationship to the issues involving the construction and application of the
insurance policies.349
The Fifth Circuit noted that once the parties settled the main action,
Texas had no further interest in whether Grace or its insurers paid the
amount of the settlement.350 The remaining dispute was between Grace, a
New York corporation, and its insurers, primarily New York residents.
Further, Grace's insurance broker was based in New York, and the policies
were solicited, negotiated, and delivered in New York. Grace also paid the
insurance premiums in New York and gave notice of the school districts'
claims in New York. New York was the center of the relationship between
Grace and the insurers, and New York has a strong interest in the outcome
of insurance coverage disputes between a New York insured and its contrac-
tual relationships with insurers doing business in New York.35 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that New York, not Texas, had the most significant
relationship to the questions of insurance law at issue in the third party
action.352
Grace petitioned for rehearing, contending that article 21.42 of the Texas
Insurance Code required application of Texas law. 35 3 Article 21.42 provides
that an insurance contract "payable to.any citizen or inhabitant of [Texas]
by any insurance company or corporation doing business [in Texas]" will be
governed by Texas law, notwithstanding certain recitations in the policy.35 4
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for panel rehearing because the policy
at issue was not payable to a Texas citizen or inhabitant, but to Grace, a
New York corporation. The court concluded that applying article 21.42 to a
case in which there has been no payment by the insurer to a Texas resident
would impermissibly give the statute extraterritorial effect to regulate busi-
ness outside Texas.35"
3. The Juxtaposition of Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Analysis
Gulf Consolidated Services, Inc v. Corinth Pipe Works, S.A. 35 6 evidences
the sometimes overlapping considerations in personal jurisdiction and choice
349. 896 F.2d at 873.
350. Id. at 874.
351. Id. at 873. The court rejected Graces argument that Texas law should control be-
cause the third party action would determine the source of funds for payment of Grace's settle-
ment with the school district. Id. at 873 (citing Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins.
Exchange, 797 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting similar argument)).
352. 896 F.2d at 874. The Fifth Circuit also held that the district court erred in applying
general rules of construction favoring the insured without first applying the substantive law of
either New York or any specific jurisdiction. General rules of construction are relied upon
only as a last resort. 896 F.2d at 874. New York law either differed from the general rules the
district court applied or was unclear on several important issues of insurance law presented.
The district court therefore erred in determining these issues under general rules of construc-
tion in lieu of submitting them to be decided in a state court. Id.
353. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
354. Id.
355. 896 F.2d at 883. The court reasoned that such an application would raise serious
questions of constitutionality under the commerce and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924)).
356. 898 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1990), discussed supra at notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
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of law analyses. Corinth, a Greek corporation, argued for the application of
Greek law, according to which Gulf's claims would be barred by a six
month statute of limitations expressly disallowing a prediscovery tolling pe-
riod.357 The Gulf court relied primarily on the stream of commerce doctrine
in its personal jurisdiction analysis; 358 the court used the most significant
relationship analysis to assess the choice of law applicable to the licensing
agreement between Corinth and API (a Dallas based organization), 359 but
the factors considered are similar. For example, in the personal jurisdiction
analysis, the court focused on the licensing agreement between Corinth and
API.36° This agreement allowed Corinth the opportunity to sell casings to
Texas customers and contained the warranty forming the basis of the dispute
in Gulf. The court also considered Corinth's $73,000,000.00 in sales of API
standard tubular goods to Texas customers. 361 After considering these same
factors in the choice of law analysis, the court emphasized that Texas has a
substantial interest in providing a remedy for a Texas citizen who has
purchased products from a foreign corporation in reliance upon a warranty
that the product conformed to the standards of a Texas organization. 362
While the personal jurisdiction and choice of law determinations in Gulf
each focused on the same factors and favored Texas, each analysis is a dis-
tinct one and can often yield different results.
C. Choice of Law in Tort Actions
In Trailways, Inc. v. Clark363 the court of appeals held that Texas law
applied in an action against an American bus company and a Mexican bus
company for damages resulting from an accident that occurred in Mex-
ico.364 Trailways, Inc. (Trailways), a busline operated in Texas, does not
provide bus service in Mexico but has an interlining agreement with Trans-
portes Del Norte (TDN), a Mexican bus line, whereby TDN honors Trail-
ways tickets from the border to destinations in Mexico. 365 TDN also has
rights to sell tickets to destinations in the United States, and Trailways hon-
ors the TDN tickets.
The plaintiffs in Clark were the survivors of two victims of a TDN bus
accident in Mexico. The decedents, American citizens and Texas residents,
purchased round trip tickets from Corpus Christi to Mexico City through a
Trailways Subsidiary. The decedents boarded a Trailways bus in Corpus
357. Corinth cited Greek Civil Code 554, 555.
358. 898 F.2d at 1073.
359. Id. at 1075-76.
360. Id. at 1074.
361. Id. at 1075.
362. Id. at 1075-76. The court rejected Corinth's argument that Texas did not have any
interest in the lawsuit as the ultimate economic loss would fall upon an Illinois insurance
corporation, just as it rejected this argument in the personal jurisdiction analysis. Id. at 1074,
1076.
363. 794 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
364. Id. at 485.
365. Id. TDN then reclaimed from Trailways the price of the ticket for the Mexican por-
tion of the journey, less a 12% Trailways commission.
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Christi and traveled to Brownsville, Texas, where they transferred to a TDN
bus to continue their journey into Mexico. The TDN driver lost control of
the bus, and the bus left the highway and overturned. The survivors of the
Texas passengers brought an action to recover wrongful death and survival
damages from TDN and Trailways.
The court of appeals considered whether the trial court had properly ap-
plied Texas law to the calculation of wrongful death damages. 366 In tort
actions, as in contract actions, Texas has adopted the most significant rela-
tionship test as set forth in sections 6 and 145 of the Second Restatement.367
Section 6 provides broad general guidelines for conflicts analysis, and section
145 applies these guidelines specifically to tort actions.368 If no other factor
besides diversity of citizenship makes the interests of one state any more
significant than those of the other, the law of the place of injury generally
determines wrongful death damages.369
In Clark, however, the court concluded that other factors controlled. The
relationship between the decedents and TDN centered in Texas because ini-
tial negotiations and ticket purchases occurred in Texas.3 70 Through TDN's
solicitation of business in Texas by virtue of the interlining agreement, Texas
acquired an interest in compelling TDN, a foreign corporation, to pay ade-
quate compensation for injuries to Texas residents, even if those injuries oc-
curred in Mexico.371 Accordingly, the court held that the trial court
366. 794 S.W.2d at 484. The court noted that TDN waived its right to rely on Mexican
indemnity law against Trailways. Id. Although TDN put the court and the parties on notice
of Mexican law by filing a letter from a Mexican attorney explaining the provisions of Mexican
law relating to wrongful death damages and including copies of the Mexican law and certified
translations, TDN did not inform the court of Mexico's indemnity law in any way. Thus, the
court of appeals concluded that the trial court properly assumed that Mexico's law, even if
applicable, was the same as Texas law. Consequently, the only choice of law issue on appeal
was whether the trial court properly applied Texas law to the calculation of wrongful death
damages. Cf Daugherty v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) (trial
court may take notice of another jurisdiction's law even if not pled).
367. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979) (adopting §§ 6 and 145 of
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS).
368. 794 S.W.2d at 484. Furthermore, § 175 of the Restatement provides that the law of
the state where the injury occurred governs unless some other state has a more significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
369. 794 S.W.2d at 485 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175
(1971); Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057, 1066 (5th Cir. 1984)).
370. Id.; see also Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex. App.-Tekarkana 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (injury occurred in Louisiana, but Texas had more significant interest based in part
on the fact that relationship began and ended in Texas). The court, emphasizing the wide-
spread adoption of the Restatement test, also relied on a Colorado case. 794 S.W.2d at 486
(citing Kinnett v. Sky's West Parachute Center, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Colo. 1984)). It
erroneously referred to the test as the "most significant contacts" test, however. 794 S.W.2d at
480. In Kinnett a Wyoming resident purchased in Wyoming a round trip airline ticket to
Dallas, Texas. The airplane crashed in Colorado, and the decedents' relatives brought a
wrongful death action in Colorado, asking the court to apply Wyoming's wrongful death stat-
ute. The court determined that Wyoming had a more significant relationship than Colorado
and emphasized that the decedent purchased his ticket in Wyoming from a corporation doing
business in Wyoming for a trip that would begin and end in Wyoming. The court further
noted that there is no injustice in requiring out-of-state corporations conducting business in
Wyoming to be responsible according to Wyoming's laws for the deaths of Wyoming residents




properly determined that Texas had the most significant relationship to the
parties and issues involved. 372 The court saw no injustice in requiring TDN
to be responsible under Texas law for the death of passengers who purchased
tickets in Texas to travel to Mexico City and return to Texas.373
In Perry v. Aggregate Plant Products Co.37 4 the court held the summary
judgment proof insufficient to support the trial court's application of Indiana
substantive law on the statute of limitations issue. 375 In Perry an Indiana
resident, who was injured at work in Indiana when a silo collapsed, brought
a product liability action against Aggregate Plant Products, a Texas com-
pany that designed and manufactured the silo in Texas. The trial court ap-
plied Indiana law and Indiana's ten-year statute of repose, which barred
plaintiff's action, and granted summary judgment for the manufacturer. 376
On appeal, the court's analysis involved application of the general princi-
ples of section 6 and the specific guidelines of section 145 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws.377 Section 145 focuses on these considera-
tions: "the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; the domicile, residence, nationality, place of in-
corporation and place of business of the parties; and the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." 378
Although the Indiana residents were injured in Indiana, the place of the
conduct causing the injury was disputed. Perry alleged that the conduct
causing the injury was the design, manufacture, and sale of the silo and that
the silo was placed into the stream of commerce in Texas. The manufacturer
argued that the silo entered the stream of commerce in Indiana because it
was substantially changed during assembly in Indiana.379 The court found
insufficient summary judgment evidence to demonstrate that the installation
372. Id. at 486-87.
373. Id. at 486.
374. 786 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
375. Id. at 23.
376. Id. at 22.
377. Id. at 23-25 (citing Gutierrez v. Collins 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979)). Section 6
sets out the most significant relationship analysis. It provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include,
(a) The needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter-
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and unifromity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
378. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
379. The manufacturer relied upon Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765
S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988), in which the court held that electricity does not enter the stream
of commerce when introduced in the transmission lines because it is substantially changed by




substantially changed the silo.380 Furthermore, the court observed that
Perry complained of the design and manufacture of the silo at the time of the
sale, not of subsequent changes. As the silo was designed and manufactured
in Texas and the cause of action was directed at the design and manufacture
of the silo, the court concluded that the conduct causing the injury occurred
in Texas.381
The parties' residence, the third factor in the section 145 analysis, was
undisputed. The plaintiffs were Indiana residents, and the manufacturer was
located and registered to do business in Texas. The court's analysis of the
final factor, the center of the parties' relationship, focused once again on the
design and manufacture of the silo in Texas. 382 As the summary judgment
evidence viewed most favorably to the nonmovant showed that the silo was
manufactured and designed in Texas, that the manufacturer was located and
registered to do business in Texas, and that the conduct causing the injury
occurred in Texas, the manufacturer failed to show that Indiana substantive
law applied as a matter of law.383 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the
summary judgment and remanded the action to the trial court.38 4
Although a choice of law issue is appropriate for summary judgment,
Perry demonstrates a movant's difficulty in achieving a favorable ruling ab-
sent clear supporting summary judgment evidence. Consequently, during
discovery, counsel should focus as specifically on choice of law facts as on
facts going to the merits of the dispute.
In Osborn v. Kinnington 38 5 the court held that an Alabama resident could
maintain his action against another Alabama resident in a Texas court even
though such an action could not be maintained in an Alabama court.3 6 0 s-
born and Kennington were Alabama residents employed as truck drivers.
When the two returned together to Alabama from California, the vehicle
Kinnington drove overturned in Texas injuring Osborn. Osborn received
workers compensation benefits from his employer and also filed suit in Texas
to recover for his injuries.
In Texas an employee has no right of action against his employer or other
employees for damages for personal injuries.387 If Osborn had filed the suit
380. 786 S.W.2d at 24.
381. Id. at 24-25. Although it was unclear where the contract was actually made, the court
resolved any doubts in favor of appellant and found that the sale took place in Texas based
upon the fact that the manufacturer's address was at the top of the invoice.
382. Id. at 25. Although the points of sale and entry into the stream of commerce were
unclear from the summary judgment evidence, the court again resolved any doubts in Perry's
favor.
383. Id. (citing Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985)).
384. 786 S.W.2d at 26.
385. 787 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
386. Id. at 420.
387. See TEx. WORKERS' COMP. AcT art. 8306, § 3; Act of March 28, 1917, 35th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 103, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 269, amended by Act of April 3, 1923. 38th Leg., R.S., ch.
177, 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws 384, amended by Act of June 10, 1963, 58th Leg., R.S., ch. 437, § 1,
1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1132, repealed by Act of December 12, 1989, 71st LEg., 2d C.S., ch. 1,
§ 16.01(7) to (9), Jan. 1990 VERNON'S TEx. SESSION LAW SERV. 114; see also Mobley v.
Moulas, 468 S.W.2d 116, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (injured em-
ployee's sole relief under Workers' Compensation Act).
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in Alabama, the Alabama court would have apparently applied Texas law
based on the rule of lex loci delecti.388 In Alabama, however, an employee
may maintain a personal injury action against a co-employee. 389 Thus, the
court was faced with a choice between the law of the forum, which would
preclude the suit, and the law of a foreign state,390 which would not preclude
the suit. The trial court applied Texas law and dismissed the action.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that Alabama law applied and that
Osborn could maintain his suit in Texas.391 In the choice of law analysis,
the court noted that the section 145 considerations in a tort case were equal,
as the injury and the conduct causing the injury both occurred in Texas,
while the residence and business of the parties and center of the relationship
were in Alabama.392 Restatement (Second) section 184,393 however, specifi-
cally addresses immunity from tort claims arising out of workers' compensa-
tion. Section 184 provides that the statute under which the employer is
required to provide insurance and under which the plaintiff has obtained an
award for the injury controls in a conflict of laws situation. 394 Thus, since
Alabama's statute controlled, Osbor could maintain his suit against the co-
employee in Texas, although an Alabama court applying Texas law would
have dismissed it.
III. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS?
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to recognize an Abu
Dhabi money judgment in Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v.
Khreich.395 In its decision the Fifth Circuit relied on one of the grounds for
nonrecognition listed in the Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money Judg-
ment Recognition Act (Recognition Act).396 Banque Libanaise Pour Le
Commerce (Bank), which has a branch office in Abu Dhabi, brought an ac-
388. 787 S.W.2d at 419.
389. Id. at 418.
390. Osborn's employer had its principal place of business in Alabama.
391. 787 S.W.2d at 419.
392. Id. at 419-20. The Court noted that the comment to § 145(2) provides that when the
injury and the conduct causing the injury occur in a clearly ascertainable state, "that state will
usually be the state of the applicable law with respect to most issues involving the tort." Id. at
419.
393. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 184 (1971).
394. 787 S.W.2d at 419; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICt OF LAWS § 184
(1971).
395. 915 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1990).
396. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-36.008 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1990)
[hereinafter The Recognition Act]. Section 36.005(b) provides:
A foreign country judgment need not be recognized if:(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign country did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the
public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;(5) the proceeding in the foreign country court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled other-
wise than by proceedings in that court;
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tion in Texas against Khreich, a Texas resident and former Abu Dhabi resi-
dent, to recover 200,000 dirhams the Bank advanced to Kheich based on an
overdraft agreement. Khreich also brought suit against the Bank in Abu
Dhabi, alleging that the Bank breached an agreement with Khreich.
The Abu Dhabi court entered judgment in favor of the Bank before the
Texas action went to trial. The Bank then filed a motion for summary judg-
ment in the Texas case, claiming that the Abu Dhabi judgment was disposi-
tive. The district court refused to recognize the Abu Dhabi judgment
because of lack of reciprocity and because Abu Dhabi does not provide pro-
cedures compatible with due process of law.397 After trial to a jury, Khreich
prevailed. 398 The Bank appealed, asserting that the district court erred in
refusing to recognize the Abu Dhabi judgment and in applying Texas law.
Applying state rather than federal law, 399 the Fifth Circuit looked to the
Recognition Act.400 The Recognition Act recognizes the enforceability of a
foreign country money judgment which is final, conclusive and enforceable
where rendered. 401 Section 5 of the Recognition Act provides, however, for
nonrecognition of a foreign country money judgment in some instances.4 ' 2
The Recognition Act specifically provides that a court has the discretion to
refuse to recognize a foreign country money judgment if "it is established
that the foreign country in which the judgment was rendered does not recog-
nize" Texas judgments.4°3
The Fifth Circuit found that Khreich met his burden of proving
nonreciprocity by introducing an affidavit of an American attorney practic-
ing in Abu Dhabi.4°4 The affidavit stated that the attorney, as well as other
members of his firm who had practiced in Abu Dhabi since 1974, was una-
ware of any Abu Dhabi courts enforcing United States judgments.
Although the Bank attempted to refute the affidavit by providing the court
with a translation of Abu Dhabi law providing for the recognition of foreign
judgments at the Abu Dhabi's court's discretion, the court concluded that
the affidavit expressed valid concerns as to whether Abu Dhabi courts would
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign coun-
try court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action; or
(7) it is established that the foreign country in which the judgment was ren-
dered does not recognize judgments rendered in this state that, but for the fact
that they are rendered in this state, conform to the definition of "foreign country
judgment."
397. 915 F.2d at 1003.
398. Id.
399. As jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the federal court applied state
rather than federal law on the recognition of foreign country money judgments. Id. at 1003;
see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
400. 915 F.2d at 1004. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 36.001-36.008 (Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1990).
401. The Recognition Act, supra note 396, § 36.004.
402. The Recognition Act, supra note 396, § 36.005(a) (mandatory provisions) and
§ 36.005(b) (discretionary provisions).
403. The Recognition Act, supra note 396, § 36.005(b)(7). A district court's decision is
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. 915 F.2d at 1004.
404. 915 F.2d at 1005-06.
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actually recognize an American judgment.405 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recognize the
Abu Dhabi judgment.406
Before 1990, the Recognition Act did not expressly contain a procedure
for a judgment debtor to assert grounds for non-recognition.4' 7 The Texas
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the pre-1990 version of the
Recognition Act in Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises,
Ltd.4°8 Docksteader obtained a judgment against Patal in the Supreme
Court of British Columbia and subsequently filed a suit in Texas state court
to recognize and enforce the judgment. The trial court refused to recognize
the judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Patal.409 The
court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the Recognition Act was uncon-
stitutional410 because it failed to provide due process as it did not expressly
set forth a procedure by which a judgment debtor could assert grounds for
non-recognition.41'
The Texas Supreme Court reversed.412 The court noted that, although the
Recognition Act did not expressly provide a procedure for a judgment
debtor to assert grounds for nonrecognition, section 36.004 of the Recogni-
tion Act expressly provides that a foreign country money judgment "is en-
forceable in the same manner as a judgment of a sister state. '413 One means
of enforcing a foreign judgment under the Texas Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act (the Enforcement Act)414 is a common law ac-
tion.415 A common law suit provides a judgment debtor notice and a prelim-
inary hearing at which he can assert all defenses, including grounds for non-
recognition, and thus due process is afforded. 416
405. Id. at 1006.
406. Id. The Fifth Circuit did not reach Khreich's argument that the district court should
not recognize the Abu Dhabi judgment because Abu Dhabi procedures did not comport with
due process. Id. at 1005 n.4. In addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of Texas
law rather than Abu Dhabi law on the grounds that the bank failed to meet its burden to
present clear proof of the relevant Abu Dhabi legal principles to the district court. Id at 1006
(citing Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d. 464, 468 n.5 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 908 (1967); Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1952)). The bank did not
produce translations of the relevant Abu Dhabi law or testimony from Abu Dhabi lawyers
explaining the applicable law until the bank appealed the district court's decision. 915 F.2d. at
1006.
407. The Recognition Act has since been amended and expressly includes procedural steps
for asserting grounds for nonrecognition. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.0041-
.0044 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
408. 794 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1990).
409. Id. at 760.
410. Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1986), rev'd, 794 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1990).
411. 794 S.W.2d at 760-61.
412. Id. at 761.
413. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.004 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
414. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991)
[hereinafter The Enforcement Act].
415. See The Enforcement Act, supra note 414, § 35.008. The Enforcement Act also pro-
vides for enforcement of foreign judgments at §§ 35.003-.005.
416. 794 S.W.2d at 761. The court expressly disapproved of Plastics Eng'g, Inc. v. Dia-
mond Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ), and Detamore v.
[Vol. 45
1991] CONFLICT OF LAWS
In Minuteman Press International, Inc. v. Sparks417 the Fort Worth court
of appeals adopted the rule that the introduction of a properly authenticated
copy of a foreign default judgment, even if signed by a clerk rather than a
judge, shifts the burden to the opposing party to establish why the judgment
should not receive full faith and credit.418 In so doing, the court specifically
disapproved the holding in Interamerican Lambs Wood Products, Ltd. v.
Doxsee Food Corp.419 The Minuteman court rejected an argument that the
presumption in favor of a foreign judgment is inapplicable when the foreign
judgment is taken by default.420 The court pointed out that while the court
does not presume the validity of a default judgment directly attacked on
appeal, courts apply the presumption of validity when the judgment is collat-
erally attacked. 421
The Sparkses entered into a franchise agreement with Minuteman Press
International, Inc. (Minuteman), to operate a printing business in Texas.
The franchise agreement contained choice of law and choice of forum provi-
sions in favor of New York law and New York courts.422 Eventually, the
Sparkses .became dissatisfied with their benefits under the franchise agree-
ment and ceased paying the franchise fee to Minuteman. Minuteman filed
suit in New York seeking damages for breach of contract. Although the
Sparkses received service of process, they did not appear in New York to
contest the suit, and the New York court entered judgment against them.423
Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), insofar as they
conflicted with the decision in Docksteader. In Detamore the court held that the Recognition
Act's failure to expressly provide for notice and an opportunity for hearing to challenge the
recognition of the foreign judgment rendered the Recognition Act unconstitutional. 731
S.W.2d at 124. The court in Plastics Engineering agreed with Detamore that the act violated
due process. 764 S.W.2d at 927. Both courts disagreed with the conclusion of the court in
Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) in which the court
concluded the right to a hearing can be inferred from the language of the statute outlining the
criteria for nonrecognition. 682 S.W.2d at 345; see also Freytag, George & McCoy, Conflict of
Laws Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw.LJ. 489, 513-14 (1990). Although Hennessey did not actu-
ally decide the constitutionality issue, it relied upon § 4 to find the inferrence of a right to a
plenary hearing just as the court in Docksteader relied upon § 4 to determine the conStitution-
ality of the Act.
417. 782 S.W.2d 339 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
418. Id. at 340-42.
419. 642 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Interamerican
Lambs Wool the court relied upon Mathis v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 583 S.W.2d 800
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), to conclude that a New York
judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in Texas. 642 S.W.2d at 826. In both Inter-
american Lambs Wool and Mathis, the courts held that a foreign judgment unsigned by the
judge is not enforceable in Texas because of the lack of indication that the judgment was
actually rendered, adopted, or signed. Interamerican Lambs Wool, 642 S.W.2d at 826; Mathis,
583 S.W.2d at 804.
420. 782 S.W.2d at 342.
421. Id. at 342-43; see Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 364 (rex. 1975) (presumption
of validity applied in collateral attack of judgment). Moreover, at least three courts have ex-
pressly rejected the proposition that the presumption in favor of a foreign judgment does not
apply if the foreign judgment was taken by default. See First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.
2d 100, 103 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hart v. Calkins Mfg. Co., 623 S.W.2d
451, 453 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ); A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric
Corp., 563 S.W.2d 281, 283 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
422. 782 S.W.2d at 341.
423. Id.
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Minuteman then brought an action in Texas to enforce the New York judg-
ment. The trial judge ruled that the Sparkses lacked sufficient New York
contacts, and, therefore, the New York judgment was invalid.424
The court of appeals relied upon Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,425 a
"remarkably similar" case,426 and found that the Sparkses had sufficient
minimum contacts with New York to support the New York court's exercise
of jurisdiction.427 The franchisees in Sparks freely entered into the agree-
ment and obligated themselves to pay franchise fees in New York. Further-
more, the franchisees agreed that New York law would govern all rights and
agreements of the parties and that any disputes regarding the franchise
agreement would be decided by New York courts. In addition, the franchis-
ees attended a mandatory two week business seminar in New York. Thus,
given the franchise agreement and the other contacts with New York, the
court held that the Sparkses could expect to come under the jurisdiction of
New York courts.428 Therefore, because the Sparkses faced the presumption
of the judgment's validity and failed to meet their burden to establish other-
wise, the Court reversed and rendered judgment that the New York judg-
ment be enforced.429
Only final judgments from other jurisdictions are entitled to the same
force and effect as Texas judgments.430 During the survey period, two appel-
late courts reversed trial courts' enforcement of nonfinal foreign judgments.
In Myers v. Ribble431 Ribble filed an action in Texas seeking to enforce a
1987 Florida divorce decree, and the trial court granted summary judgment
in her favor.432 Myers, Ribble's ex-husband, appealed on the grounds that
the Florida decree was not a final judgment because the court specifically
reserved jurisdiction to determine attorneys' fees and court costs.4 33
The court of appeals sustained Myers' position that the Florida decree was
not final and therefore was not enforceable in Texas. 434 The court distin-
guished Medical Administrators, Inc v. Koger Properties, Inc.435 in which
the court considered a Florida judgment final although the Florida trial
court reserved jurisdiction to consider additional attorneys' fees incurred in
424. Id.
425. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In Burger King the United States Supreme Court concluded that
a Florida court had jurisdiction over a Michigan franchisee based upon the franchise agree-
ment, coupled with negotiations contemplating future consequences in Florida, as well as the
actual course of dealing between the parties. Id. at 471-72, 476.
426. 782 S.W.2d at 341.
427. Id. at 342.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 343.
430. See Medical Administrators, Inc. v. Koger Properties, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ); Simonsen v. Simonsen, 414 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ).
431. 796 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
432. Id. at 223.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 224.
435. 668 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ.) ("[A] judgment
otherwise disposing of all issues between the parties is not rendered interlocutory if further
proceedings may be required to carry the judgment into effect .. ").
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supplemental proceedings because in Koger the court retained jurisdiction
only over future proceedings. 436 In Myers the face of the decree indicated
the court's retention of jurisdiction in the same proceeding and thus the
nonfinality of the judgment.437
Failure to dispose of a counterclaim in an order granting summary judg-
ment renders the order nonfinal and precludes enforceability of the judgment
in a foreign forum. In Stine v. Koga438 Koga brought an action against the
Stines in Hawaii, alleging default under a condominium sales agreement.
The Stines counterclaimed, asserting a deceptive trade practices cause of ac-
tion against Koga. Koga moved for summary judgment "for the relief de-
manded in the Complaint." 439 The Hawaiian trial court granted the motion
for summary judgment and entered an interlocutory decree of foreclosure.44
After the property was sold, Koga obtained a deficiency judgment against
the Stines in Hawaii and sought to enforce it in Texas. 44 1 The Stines moved
to stay enforcement, contending that the judgment did not dispose of the
counterclaim and therefore was not final. The trial court denied the
motion." 2
The court of appeals reversed and rendered, holding that, as the summary
judgment did not mention or refer to all of the issues in the counterclaim,
these issues remained unadjudicated, and therefore the judgment was not
final." 3 Accordingly, the Hawaiian judgment was not entitled to full faith
and credit and was unenforceable. 4"
In Mayhew v. Caprito"5 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether the
court of appeals correctly refused to recognize the Louisiana Supreme
Court's judgment that Caprito was a Louisiana domiciliary when he died."6
The court of appeals' decision that the judgment need not be recognized
directly conflicted with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Durfee
v. Duke." 7 Duke held that once questions have been fully and fairly liti-
gated and judgment is rendered, absent fraud, the judgment is entitled to full
faith and credit, even as to questions of jurisdiction." 8 Thus, the Texas
Supreme Court, without hearing oral argument, reversed the appellate
court's ruling as contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Duke." 9
436. 796 S.W.2d at 224.
437. Id. at 225.
438. 790 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no writ).
439. Id. at 413.
440. Id.
441. Id. Koga sought to enforce the deficiency judgment in Texas pursuant to the Enforce-
ment Act. See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
442. 790 S.W.2d at 413.
443. Id. at 414-15 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lindsay, 787 S.W.2d 51, 52-53 (Tex.
1990)).
444. Id. at 415.
445. 794 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1990).
446. Id. at 2.
447. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
448. Id. at 111.
449. 794 S.W.2d at 2 (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 400 (rex.
1991]
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1979)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 133(b) (when appellate court's decision conflicts directly with
supreme court ruling, supreme court may grant writ of error and, without hearing oral argu-
ment, reverse lower court's judgment).
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